The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Unigard Insurance Company : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Unigard
Insurance Company : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Barbara K. Berrett; Mark D. Taylor; Berrett and Taylor; Attorneys for Appellant.
Rebecca L. Hill; Christensen and Jensen; Attorneys for Appellee .
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Unigard Insurance Company, No. 20090340 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1622
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE OHIO CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., 
Appellant, 
UNIGARD INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
Appellee. 
Case No. 20090340-SC 
On Order Certifying State Law Question From The United 
States Court of Appeals For The Tenth Circuit Case No. 08-4003 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
UNIGARD INSURANCE COMPANY BEFORE 
THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
Barbara K. Berrett 
Mark D. Taylor 
BERRETT & TAYLOR, LC. 
Ken Garff Building 
405 South Main Street, Suite 1050 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7733 
email: bberrett@berrettandtaylor.com 
mtaylor@berrettandtavlor.com 
Counsel for Appellant 
The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company 
REBECCA L. HILL 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)323-5000 
email: rebecca.hill@chrisien.com 
Counsel for Appellee 
Unigard Insurance Company 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT - i 2009 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE OHIO CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., 
Appellant, 
v. 
UNIGARD INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
Appellee. 
Case No. 20090340-SC 
On Order Certifying State Law Question From The United 
States Court of Appeals For The Tenth Circuit Case No. 08-4003 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
UNIGARD INSURANCE COMPANY BEFORE 
THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
Barbara K. Berrett 
Mark D. Taylor 
BERRETT & TAYLOR, LC. 
Ken Garff Building 
405 South Main Street, Suite 1050 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7733 
email: bberrettigjberrettandtaylor.com 
mtaylor@berrettandtaylor.com 
Counsel for Appellant 
The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company 
REBECCA L. HILL 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)323-5000 
email: rebecea.hillfSjchrisien.com 
Counsel for Appellee 
Unigard Insurance Company 
i 
COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN 
PRIOR COURT PROCEEDINGS 
The following list is a complete list of all parties to the proceedings in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and/or at the district court level in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division: 
The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company: 
Unigard Insurance Company: 
West American Insurance Company: 
Cloud Nine, LLC: 
Easy Seat, LLC: 
Rodney Ford: 
Blaine Ford: 
Rex Haddock: 
Plaintiff, Counter Defendant, Crossclaim 
Defendant, and Appellant 
Plaintiff Intervenor, Cross Claimant, and 
Appellee 
Plaintiff, Counter Defendant and 
Crossclaim Defendant 
Defendant and Counter Claimant 
Defendant and Counter Claimant 
Defendant and Counter Claimant 
Defendant and Counter Claimant 
Defendant and Counter Claimant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
COMPLETE LIST OF PARTIES IN PRIOR COURT PROCEEDING ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS iii 
STATEMENT OF AUTHORITIES v 
QUESTION CERTIFIED TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 7 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 11 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 19 
ARGUMENT 21 
THE DEFENSE COSTS SHOULD BE ALLOCATED EQUALLY BETWEEN 
OHIO CASUALTY AND UNIGARD UNDER THE EQUAL SHARES 
METHOD PROVIDED BY THE OTHER INSURANCE PROVISION 21 
A. The Other Insurance Provision Applies To And Provides For The 
Method Of Equal Sharing Of Defense Costs Between Ohio Casualty and 
Unigard 21 
1. The Decision In Sharon Steel 21 
2. Applying The Sharon Steel Decision To This Action 24 
3. The Application Of The Other Insurance Provision Is Not Limited Solely To 
Circumstances In Which The Insurance Policies Have 
Concurrent/Overlapping Insurance 26 
4. The Taco Bell Decision And Other Authorities Do Not Support A Finding By This 
Court That The Other Insurance Provisions Apply Only To Circumstances of 
Concurrent/Overlapping Insurance 30 
a. The Taco Bell Decision 30 
b. Other Authorities Supporting And Rejecting The Proposition That 
Other Insurance Provisions Only Apply To Circumstances Of 
Concurrent/Overlapping Insurance 34 
B. Utah's Law Regarding An Insurer's Duty To Defend Justifies 
Apportioning Defense Costs By Equal 50/50 Shares Between Ohio 
Casualty andUnigard 36 
1. Utah Law Regarding The Duty To Defend 37 
2. The Benjamin Decision 37 
3. Ohio Casualty's Method Of Apportionment Of Defense Costs Is Contrary To 
Utah's Law Regarding An Insurer's Duty to Defend 40 
4. The Benjamin And The Sharon Steel Decisions 41 
CONCLUSION - 45 
I V 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Ames v. Continental Cas. Co., 340 S.E.2d 479 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) 39 
Aviles v. Burgos, 783 F.2d 270 (1 Cir. 1986} 33 
Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, 140 P.2d 1210 18, 20, 36, 37, 38, 41 
Boston Gas Company v. Century Ind. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 308 (Mass. 2009) 35 
Continental Casualty Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 932 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) 32 
Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc, v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 
714 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1986) 37 
Emhartlnd. v. Century Ind. Co., 359 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2009) 35 
Federal Ins. Co. v. Cablevision Systems Development Co., 
836 F.2d 54 (2nd Cir. 1987) 32, 33, 39 
Fire Ins. Exch. v. Estate ofTherkelsen, 2001 UT 48, 27 P.3d 555 37 
IMCERA Group, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 47 Cal.App.4th 699 (1996) 23 
Mt. Airy Ins. Co. v. Greenbaum, 127F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1997) 18,38 
Novell, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 141 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1998) 17, 43 
Overthrust v. Home Ins. Co., 676 F.Supp. 1086 (D. Utah 1987) 38 
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127 
(Utah 1997) 1, 11, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 37, 42 
Simmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 43 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 235 
(4th Cir. 1990) 34,39 
S.W. Energy v. Continental Ins. Co., 1999 UT 23, 974 P.2d 1239 27 
Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 388 F.3d 1069 
(7th Cir. 2004) 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 
Texas Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Assoc, v. Southwest Aggregates, Inc., 
982 S.W.2d 600 (Tx. Ct. App. 1999) 39 
Wooddale Builder, Inc. v. Maryland Cas Co., 772 N.W.2d 283 (Minn. 2006) 39 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-20-101 (2005) 38 
Treatises 
Appleman on Insurance Law and Practice § 136.2[D] (2d ed. 2006) 38 
Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Ed. 1990) 27 
Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in "Other Insurance, " Multiple Insurance, 
and Self-Insurance, 22 Pepp. L. Rev.1373 (1995) 31, 34, 35 
Michael G. Doherty, Comment, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability Among 
Successive Insurance Policies, 64 U. Cm. L. REV. 257 (1997) 34 
QUESTION CERTIFIED TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
In its Order dated June 18, 2009, this Court stated that it accepts the following 
question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit: "As to the 
EdiZone case described in the certification order, whether the defense costs should be 
allocated between Appellant [Ohio Casualty] and Appellee [Unigard] under the "equal 
shares" method set forth in the "other insurance clause" of Appellant's policy or 
according to the "time on the risk" method described in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co.. 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997)." Addendum, Order dated June 
18, 2009 (Exhibit "C"). 
LAW OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE1 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
which are determinative of the certified question or of central importance to the certified 
question or appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The above-captioned matter is a declaratory judgment action to determine the rights 
and obligations of two insurers in providing defense and indemnification for two insured 
limited liability companies and their members for a civil suit brought by a product and 
technology developer who had entered into a license agreement with the insureds. The two 
insured limited liability companies are Defendants and Counter Claimants Cloud Nine, 
1
 Pursuant to the Court's Briefing Notice, dated July 20, 2009, Appellee Unigard 
Insurance Company has not included within its Opening Brief a statement of jurisdiction 
and statement of issues as required by Subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) of URAP 24. 
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LLC, and Easy Seat, LLC, and their members are Defendants and Counter Claimants 
Rodney Ford, Blaine Ford and Rex Haddock (collectively referred to as the "Cloud Nine 
Defendants"). The successive insurers of the Cloud Nine Defendants are Appellant The 
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company ("Ohio Casualty") (June 2001-2002) and Appellee 
Unigard Insurance Company ("Unigard") (December 2002-2005).3 The product and 
technology developer is Edizone LC and the underlying suit was Edizone, LC v. Cloud 
Nine, LLC, et ai, Civil No. 1:04CV00117 (referred to as the "Edizone Suit") filed in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, before the 
Honorable Ted Stewart. 
In August 2004, Edizone filed the Edizone Suit against the Cloud Nine Defendants 
and other entities asserting various statutory, tort and contract causes of action arising 
from alleged violation of the License Agreement for "Gelastic™" and "GellyComb™" 
technologies, and alleged infringement of Edizone's patents, trademarks, trade names, and 
logos while marketing, advertising and selling the Cloud Nine Defendants' products. 
Shortly after being served with the Edizone Suit's Complaint, the Cloud Nine 
Defendants tendered their defense to Ohio Casualty and Unigard based on the Personal 
and Advertising Injury Liability coverage included in the policies of insurance. Ohio 
Casualty denied the Cloud Nine Defendants' tender and filed the above-captioned action 
2
 The Cloud Nine Defendants did not participate in the briefing or oral argument before 
the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. 
3
 The Cloud Nine Defendants were also insured by West American Insurance Company for 
the period of 1998-2001 and West American is an original Plaintiff in this action. However, 
in the proceedings before the district court, the parties agreed that none of the allegations of 
the Edizone Suit triggered a duty to defend or indemnify under the policies issued by West 
American. 
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in July 2005 in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, 
before the Honorable Tena Campbell. Unigard accepted the Cloud Nine Defendants' 
tender of defense under a reservation of rights and sought intervention into the above-
captioned action. 
On May 22, 2006, Unigard filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Regarding Insurers' Defense Obligations asserting that: 1) both Ohio Casualty and 
Unigard owe a duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit; and 2) the 
costs to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants should be shared equally (50/50 basis) 
between Unigard and Ohio Casualty. Ohio Casualty opposed Unigard's Motion arguing 
that it owed no duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants, but even if it did owe a 
defense, the apportionment of defense obligations between the co-insurers should be 
based on a "time on the risk" method of apportionment, such that it owes 3/45ths of the 
defense costs based on a time ratio of three months on the risk. Ohio Casualty also 
argued that the Cloud Nine Defendants owe an apportionment of the defense costs for a 
six-month time period of time between June and December 2002 in which it was not 
insured (6/45ths), and that Unigard owes the remaining amount of the defense costs 
(36/45ths). 
The district court heard oral argument on Unigard's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on September 21, 2006. On November 14, 2006, the district court issued an 
Order and Memorandum Decision granting Unigard's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment ordering that both Ohio Casualty and Unigard owe a duty to defend the Cloud 
Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit, and ordering that the defense costs and fees 
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incurred in defending the Cloud Nine Defendant are to be shared by Ohio Casualty and 
Unigard on an equal basis. See APLT APP, v. 13, at 2062-2078; see also Addendum, 
District Court Order and Memorandum Decision at 1-17 (Exhibit "A"). In making its 
ruling, the district court rejected Ohio Casualty's method of apportionment based on 
months on the risk, finding that an "equal shares" apportionment method is supported by 
the Other Insurance provisions found in the insurance policies issued by Ohio Casualty 
and Unigard, as well as Utah's law regarding an insurer's duty to defend. See APLT 
APP, v. 13, at 2076-2078 (Vol. 13). Ohio Casualty filed a Motion to Reconsider, which 
the district court denied on January 24, 2007. See APLT APP, v. 13, at 2132. 
During the months which followed, Ohio Casualty and Unigard paid and/or 
received reimbursement for their respective fifty percent/equal share of the defense costs 
based on the district court's Order and Memorandum Decision. Additionally, in July 
2007, Ohio Casualty and Unigard were able to resolve the claims alleged against the 
Cloud Nine Defendants by entering into a settlement agreement with Edizone, LC. The 
claims alleged against the Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit were dismissed, 
and as such, the remaining issues regarding the insurers' obligations of indemnification 
became moot in this action. On November 27, 2007, the district court's order granting 
Unigard's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Insurers' Defense 
Obligations became a final and appealable order when the district court granted the Order 
on Stipulated Motion to Dismiss, dismissing all remaining claims with prejudice. See 
APLT APP, v. 13, at 2144-2146. 
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Ohio Casualty appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in 
favor of Unigard to the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, on the sole issue of 
apportionment of defense costs between Ohio Casualty and Unigard. See Notice of 
Appeal, APLT APP, v. 13, at 2147-2149. Ohio Casualty did not appeal the district 
court's initial finding that Ohio Casualty and Unigard owe a duty to defend the Cloud 
Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit. See id. Ohio Casualty and Unigard filed appellate 
briefs and on January 14, 2009, the Tenth Circuit Court heard oral argument on the 
matter. On April 28, 2009, the Tenth Circuit Court issued an Order requesting this Court 
to exercise its discretion to accept the certified question of whether defense costs should 
be allocated based on the Other Insurance Provision or using the time-on-risk method 
described in the case of Sharon Steel v. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. And Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127 
(1997). See Addendum, Tenth Circuit Order, dated April 28, 2009 at 3 (Exhibit "B"). 
On June 18, 2009, this Court issued an Order accepting the certified questioned and 
stating it in the following manner: 
As to the EdiZone case described in the certification order, 
whether the defense costs should be allocated between 
Appellant and Appellee under the "equal shares" method set 
forth in the "other insurance clause" of Appellant's policy or 
according to the "time on the risk" method described in 
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 
127, 140 (Utah 1997). 
Addendum, Order, dated June 18, 2009, at 1 (Exhibit "C"). 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 6, 2005, Ohio Casualty filed its Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment to determine the rights and obligations, if any, of the insurers of the Cloud 
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Nine Defendants West American, Ohio Casualty and Unigard in providing defense and 
indemnification for the Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit. (APLT APP, v. 1-2, 
at 16-438). 
2. The Edizone Suit was a civil suit brought by a product and technology 
developer, Edizone, which licensed patents and other intellectual property to the Cloud 
Nine Defendants for manufacture and sale of an elastomer gel technology and product 
known as "Gelastic" and "GellyComb." (APLT APP, v. 1, at 54-103). 
3. From April 7, 1998 until March 11, 2002, the Cloud Nine Defendants had a 
license agreement with Edizone, whereby they could use Edizone's trademarks and 
intellectual property. Id. However, on March 11, 2002, Edizone terminated the Cloud 
Nine Defendants' license agreement. (APLT APP, v. 1, at 61, f 47). 
4. Notwithstanding the license termination on March 11, 2002, Edizone 
alleged that the Cloud Nine Defendants continued to make, market, advertise, sell, and/or 
alter the elements of GellyComb products in violation of its intellectual property rights. 
(APLT APP, v. 1, at 62-63). 
5. As a result of the Cloud Nine Defendants' alleged infringement of 
Edizone's patents, trademarks, trade names, and logos/graphics while marketing, 
advertising, and selling their products after the lease termination, Edizone filed suit on 
August 26, 2004. (APLT APP, v. 1, at 54-103). 
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6. Edizone's Complaints4 generally asserted multiple and continuing incidents 
of marketing and advertising activities (e.g. websites, metatags) which allegedly 
infringed upon its patents, trademarks, trade names, website graphics and logos and 
injured its established good will in the market. Edizone sought equitable relief and 
damages for the alleged infringing and injurious activities. (APLT APP, v. 1, at 54-103 
[Complaint] and v. 10, at 1577-1622 [Second Amended Complaint]).5 
7. During the period of time that the alleged infringing offenses occurred, the 
Cloud Nine Defendants were insured by separate, non-concurrent, insurance policies 
issued by Ohio Casualty and Unigard. (APLT APP, v. 2, at 323 and v. 4, at 632). 
8. Ohio Casualty provided liability insurance coverage to Cloud Nine with a 
policy period of from June 10, 2001 to June 10, 2002. (APLT APP, v. 2, at 323 and v. 6, 
at 1048). 
9. Unigard provided liability insurance coverage for a three-year period from 
December 12, 2002 to December 12, 2005. (APLT APP, v. 4, at 632, 665; v. 5, at 820-
984). 
10. During the six month gap between the expiration of the Ohio Casualty 
policy on June 10, 2002, and the inception of the Unigard policy on December 12, 2002, 
the Cloud Nine Defendants were uninsured. (APLT APP, v. 6, at 1069). 
4
 Edizone filed an First Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint during its 
suit against the Cloud Nine Defendants. 
For a more complete and detailed account of the alleged offenses of the Cloud Nine 
Defendants and alleged injuries asserted by Edizone as quoted from Edizone's 
Complaints, please refer to the Statement of Undisputed Material Facts of Unigard's 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Insurers' 
Defense Obligations. (APLT APP v. 4, at 662-677). 
n 
11. For the first nine months of Ohio Casualty's policy from June 10, 2001 
until March 11, 2002, the Cloud Nine Defendants had a license agreement with Edizone, 
whereby they could use Edizone's trademarks and intellectual property, thus, Edizone 
could not and did not assert claims for any advertising injury during that period. 
Accordingly, it is Ohio Casualty's contention that it only had three months on the risk, 
dating from the termination of the license agreement to the end of its policy period, i.e.; 
March 11, 2002 through June 10, 2002. (APLT APP, v. 2, at 323, 337). 
12. The Ohio Casualty and Unigard Policies provide liability insurance 
coverage for personal and advertising injury to the Cloud Nine Defendants. The Policies' 
"Insuring Agreement" for personal and advertising injury are identical and provide, in 
relevant part: 
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of "personal and 
advertising injury" to which this insurance applies. We will 
have the right and duty to defend the insured against any 
"suit" seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty 
to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for 
"personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance does 
not apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any offense 
and settle any claim or "suit" that may result. 
* * * * 
b. This insurance applies to: 
"personal and advertising injury" caused by an offense arising 
out of your business but only if the offense was committed in 
the "coverage territory" during the policy period. 
(APLT APP, v. 2, at 337 [Ohio Casualty Policy] and v. 5, at 917 [Unigard Policy]). 
13. The Ohio Casualty and Unigard Policies define personal and advertising 
injury, as it relates to the claims in the Edizone Suit, as: 
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SI«TIOI ' I \ ' Dl'l'INI'I'IONS 
I i I • * 
"Personal and advertising injury" means injur v including 
consequential "bodily injury" arising out of OIK or more of the 
following offenses: 
* * * * 
he use of another's advertising idea in your "advertisement", or 
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, tnde dress or slogan m \ -ur 
"advertisement." 
(APL 1 APP, v. 2 at 345; [Ohio Casualty Policy] and v. 5 at 928 [Unigard Policy]). 
1A The Ohio Casualty and Unigard Policies further contain idei itical Other 
If iSilFtibv |MO \\\}\\\ \\ lilt III i l l p.i l I 
Other Insurance 
If other \alid and vollcclihlc insurance is a\ailable to ihc 
insured lor a lo<s we cover under Coxerages A or R of this 
Coverage Part, *-IM obligations arc limited as follows: 
a. Primary Insurance 
This insurance is primary except when h oelow applies. If 
this insurance is primary, our obligations arc not a fleeted 
unless any of the oilier insurance is also primary - 1 hen. u e 
v. ill duire with all thai oilier insurance b\ (he method 
described in c. below 
c. Method in Sharing 
If all of the other insurance permits conn h^nion b\ equal 
shares, we will follow this method also. 1 nder this approach 
each insi irer contributes equal ainouuK u. :d n ha^ paid its 
applicable limit of insurance or none of the loss remains, 
whichever comes first. 
If any other insurance does no i pcrnm uM.inhtiiiuh i-; ^quai 
shares, we will contribute by limits, tinder this method, each 
insurer's share is based on the ratio of its applicable limit of 
insurance to the total applicable hmU:> oi insurance of all 
insurers. 
(API • I \P;i \ \ 2, at 342-343 [01 lie > Casualty Policy] i u i< 1 v 5, i it 924 925 [I It ligard 
l v i c > ])• 
is 
15. The one Ohio Casualty Policy and three Unigard Policies provide identical 
liability policy limits for personal and advertising injury of $1,000,000.00. (APLT APP, 
v. 2, at 324 [Ohio Casualty Policy] and v. 5, at 906 [Unigard Policy]). 
16. On May 22, 2006, Unigard filed a motion for partial summary judgment, 
arguing that as a matter of law both insurers had a duty to defend the Cloud Nine 
Defendants, and all defense costs incurred in defending the Cloud Nine Defendants 
should be shared equally (50/50) between Unigard and Ohio Casualty. (APLT APP, v. 4, 
at 654-656). 
17. The parties fully briefed Unigard's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Judge Campbell heard oral argument on the Motion on September 21, 2006 and issued an 
Order Memorandum Decision on November 14, 2006 granting Unigard5s Motion. 
(APLT APP, v. 1, at 1-15); see also Addendum, Order and Memorandum Decision dated 
November 14, 2006 (Exhibit "A"). 
18. In regards to the insurers' duty to defend, the district court made the 
following findings and ruling: 
In short, the Edizone allegations fall within the definition of 
advertising injury as the offense of "use of another's 
advertising idea in your 'advertisement,'" and the first part of 
the Novell test is satisfied. 
* * * * 
The second part of the Novell test is also met because 
Edizone's Complaint alleges a causal connection between 
Edizone's injuries and the Cloud Nine Defendants' 
advertising activities. Edizone alleges that it has suffered 
injury to its trade names as a result of the Cloud Nine 
misconduct and it expressly seeks relief prohibiting the Cloud 
Nine Defendants from using the trade names and trademarks 
on their websites, in advertising or in any other way. Those 
16 
Hrnrns show the causal connection between Edi/onc s alleged 
ry from the Cloud Nine Defendants' use of lidizone^s 
crtising ideas in its advertisements. Cloud Nine's 
advertising activities "caused [Edi/onCs) mjui\ not 
merely exposed it." See Novell 141 I-.MI H VKO 
C\p; : . \ i } i ? ' .ti .0 '_- ."» *» sre UIM> Addendum. • -..k: j ; i . .u->. •;.•• -i. ; t 
Dccisioi i < Iate< I.lx h : n < ( mil >ei 1 1 ,2006 : it 11 12 (Exl ill >it " ^ '; '"). 
19 j n regards to the issue of apport ionment oj defense costs. I hiigard's 
argument in its Mot ion for Partial Summary Judgment is based upon the h>lk i. 
Insi ii ai ice" provisions llnl p n i n d e d I'M 'in n|ii,i! dMiihnl inn n| defense costs w 1 ten other 
valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss covered by the policy. 
(API 7 APP v ; ,,) 655-656) . 
20, Ohio Casualty responded to I hitgard's motion lot sumnmiy ludjjiiu/iil 
arguing, in p.til lliiil tin "< Kin i Insni'.inu." pio\isi<>ns unl\ applies Io concurrent 
coverage of another insurer for losses that occurred during the June 10. 2oo [ u i i m c '•• 
2002 policy period. Ohio Casualty further argues ih<ti because the "Other insurance" 
provisions were inapplicable to si tccessive ii ISI n at ice policies, tt le "tii i le oi i the i isk" • 
defense cost allocation method mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in Sharon Steel v. 
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. And Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127 (1997) controls. (API T A P P v. 6, at 
\tm \m\ i 
2 1 . In its Order and M e m o r a n d u m Decision, the district court rejected Ohio 
Casua ln *s "link; on the risk" method, finding that the language of the "Other Insurance" 
Prtn iMons i on- >J* «; .-. h.-.. * - Casualty ,MM) i inward i"*'hcics apph ;o me case such 
t - • • • • • - . > : . . . • : 
17 
Ohio Casualty argues that the method of sharing set 
forth in the insurance policies' Other Insurance provisions 
only applies to circumstances in which there are two 
concurrent primary policies, which have overlapping 
insurance policy periods. Such a limited application is not 
supported by the specific language in the provisions. Nothing 
in the provisions' language restricts their application to the 
circumstance of overlapping and/or concurrent insurance. 
The introductory paragraph described the other insurance 
simply as insurance which is available to the insured for ua 
loss we cover." The term "loss" is a very broad term, and 
such "loss" can be caused by multiple "offenses" under 
Coverage B which can span successive policy periods. Had 
the insurers mean to limit the application of the Other 
Insurance provision to concurrent instances only, they could 
have drafted the language differently. As the policies stand 
now, there is no limiting language. 
Also, Ohio Casualty's suggested allocation method— 
which includes allocating a six month period of time to the 
Cloud Nine Defendants (for a period of time during which 
they were unable to find and obtain insurance)—essentially 
advocates the position that an insurer has a duty to defend 
only those claims covered by its insurance policy. That 
proposition is directly contrary to Utah case law, which 
requires an insurer to defend covered and non-covered claims 
in the same lawsuit until the insurer can limit the suit to 
claims outside the policy. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. 
Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210, 1216 (Utah 2006) ("'[I]f an insurer 
has a duty to defend one count of a complaint, it must defend 
them all'") (quoting Mt. Airy Ins. Co. v. Greenbaum, 127 
F.3dl5, 19(lstCir. 1997). 
Based on the plain language of the insurance policies 
and Utah law regarding the scope of an insurer's duty to 
defend, the court holds that the defense costs in the Edizone 
case (incurred and to be incurred) are to be shared by Ohio 
Casualty and Unigard on an equal basis. 
(APLT APP v. 13, at 2077-2078; see also Addendum, Order and Memorandum 
Decision, dated November 14, 2006 at 16-17 (Exhibit "A")). 
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It i its a p p e a l of tl ne dis t i ict cc n it: Vs Oi dei at ic i I\ lei i lorai ldi 11 i: i Decisioi 1, 01 ilo 
Cast ialt;y did i lot appeal the first part of the court's ruling rindim: i hat both insurers had a 
dui\ to defend the Cloud.Nine Defendants in the Edizom Min ()hio Casualty appealed 
only the second pari of UK di-rict couri , miing "regarding t u wi;.,^ati,>ir- M ^  j\v.e 
costs at id all attoi i leys' fees ii ici irred ii t dcfei idii tg tl te i inderly ii ig" Edizone Si lit ( A PI • I 
APP,v . 13, at 2148-2149). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
• Tl le disti ict coi n I: grai ited pai tial si it i ii t tai: y ji idgi i te i it ii t fav or of -
that Ohio Casualty and Unigard each owe a duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants in 
the Edizone Suit, and ruling that the apportionment of defense costs should be shared 
equally ! etween the insurers. \\u -.w A\ KI ouirt propem Mua.o IU :a\«-» • •! ii!.-;. 
apj" •••••••••t of def-UM1 .^» A . K-- .1 . . . MULC*'* -•), .- Mlu f^ .wv. 
provision contained wiiliin the insurance policies issued b\ Ohio Casualty and I nigard, 
which show the intent of the si iccessive insurers to contribute/share equally in providing 
defense to tl i< ; ( )U tin 1 1 4'it ie Defei tdai its; and 2 ) ! It al i s la i < ' i egardii lg tl le scope of ai l 
insurer's duly tu it^ insureds. 
In answering the certified question before it, llieri. is no reason for this Couii" v 
rejec ilk oism- . .,:: ..:: . l ami : Kuuiunh... aim, a ; . * U ' - ^ ' — - . -r ,f i 
case. Coi ltrary to 01 lio Casi mlty's argument, the application of the subject Other 
Insurance provision, as drafted, is nnt limited solelx to circumstances of concurrent 
insurance policies ' 1 1 ie expressed language of ilie nihi .;durance pro\ isiun d. -es not 
support Mich a n sin* led appln alum luit i . i thu, (lie pm isinn's u\< nl the broad term 
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"loss we cover" shows the insurers' intent to share when any other primary insurance 
covers a loss, whether the insurance is concurrent, successive, or a different type of 
liability coverage altogether (e.g. CGL policy, homeowners policy, professional liability 
policy). Indeed, application of the policies' Other Insurance provision in this case 
follows and is consistent with this Court's decision in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997), and specifically that the decision's 
statement that courts apply equitable principles when apportioning defense costs among 
insurers "unless express policy language decrees the method of apportionment" Sharon 
Steel, 931 P.2d at 140. The Sharon Steel decision does not mandate, as Ohio Casualty 
asserts, that the time on the risk method of apportionment is the only proper method of 
apportionment permitted under Utah law. 
Moreover, the equal apportionment of defense costs between Ohio Casualty and 
Unigard, as provided by the expressed language of the Other Insurance provision, 
comports with the basic tenets of Utah insurance law that an insurers duty to defend is 
broader than the duty to indemnify, and that when an insurer owes a duty to defend one 
claim of a complaint it must defend all claims alleged in the complaint. See Benjamin v. 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, ^ 24-25, 140 P.2d 1210. Consequently, when two 
insurers owe the same insureds a duty to defend, their duties to those insureds in 
defending all claims are equal. Ohio Casualty's method of allocation of months on the 
risk (requiring an allocation of defense for six months of no insurance be borne by the 
insureds) directly contradicts that tenet of an insurer's duty to defend all claims, as it 
results ii i tl ic ii isi it ei oi lly 1 1a v ii ig to defend 1 1 lose clain is c overed i n idei its ii i.si irance 
policy in time and content. 
Accordingly, the Court should answer the certified question that the defense costs 
"eqi lai shares" i i lethod set foi tl i ii i tl le Oil ler Insurance provision contained in Ohio 
Casualty's and Unigard's Insurance Policies. 
ARGUMENT 
m E D £ F E N S E C o S T S SHOULD BE ALLOCA I EI) EQUALI , \ 
f TWEEN OHIO CASUALTY AND UNIGARD UNDER THE EQUAL 
SHARES METHOD PROVIDED BY THE OTHER INSURANCE 
PROVISION. 
A, The Other Insurance Provision \pp!ic" To AFK? Pr~vHr^ For The Method \ H" 
Equal Sharing Of Defense Costs Between Ohio <"a^ uali* .nut Unioard 
Upon deter i :t lii lii ig tl lat botl i Ohio * •: a; ' i * ! '••• -t >U\\^ o deiend the 
Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit, the district -.our was laced with the question 
of how the insurers should share in that defense duty, and more specifkuih luw >in i id 
defei lse costs be allocated ai i ic i ig tl le in isi it c i s U' it! lii I tl i : last decade, tl lis Coi irt 
addressed that topic of allocation of defense costs in the case of Sharon Steel Corp. v. 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127 (I Jtal I 1997). 
1. i 
The Sharon Steel decision involves, among other questions oi insurance a n erage, 
a claim of equitable subrogation brought by insurer Aetna Casualty against two other 
insurers which issi led policies to SI lai on Steel Coi poi atioi i (""'"SI lai oi l Steel''"11) ov ei apei iod 
ol P O K •
 : ;J .< . -I ! t-c underlying litigation against Sharon Steel inv olved claims 
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brought by the federal Environmental Protection Agency, under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), for liability of 
costs associated with clean up of decades (as much as seventy years) of disposal of 
hazardous wastes from milling ore at Sharon Steel5s Midvale, Utah property. Aetna 
provided defense to Sharon Steel in the CERCLA action and after reaching settlement of 
that action, it filed suit seeking contribution for payment of defense and indemnification 
costs from the other insurers which issued policies to Sharon Steel. Sharon Steel, 931 
P.2datl30-31.6 
On appeal of Aetna's contribution action, this Court addressed a number of issues, 
including ruling that Aetna had a legal right to make a claim of contribution and equitable 
subrogation against the other insurers for reasonable defense costs. See id. at 136-140. 
In recognizing the right of equitable subrogation, the court acknowledged insurers' equal 
obligations to defend the insured: 
Whether an insurer can compel contribution from a coinsurer 
who is equally obligated to defend is a question that resulted 
in a split of authority. Some jurisdictions have held that 
because the duty to defend is personal to each insurer, the 
obligation is several and where many carriers are obligated to 
defend, each separate carrier is neither entitled to divide the 
duty nor require contribution from another absent a specific 
contractual right. . . . However, the trend in other jurisdictions 
have been to allow an insurer, under the doctrines of 
contribution or equitable subrogation, to recover costs of 
defense from the other insurers who are equally obligated to 
defense yet failed to do so. . . 
* * * * 
6
 Unigard recognizes that the facts of the Sharon Steel case are more complicated than 
the above-described summary of facts. However, for purposes of explaining its ruling 
regarding apportionment of defense, the brief summary of the facts should suffice. 
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We agree with ihosc juiisdiUiims that ha\e ..iiwv'ved 
contribution where one insurer has paid more than its fair 
share of the defense costs. Where it can he .4io\\n ih.it a co-
insurer failed to pa\ its share vlYne defense expenses, flu! 
insurer should n*»1 he rewarded and paymenl excused when 
another co-insurer has taken upon itself the provision of that 
defense. 
hi ;tl i W, I >K. 
Upon establishing the right of equitable subrogation, tlie court addressed the issue 
of apportionment of the defense costs; "Because this conn iind;> ;n.a Aetna is e. \-.\w^ . ) 
he leiiubursed Im Iliose defense expenses t( p;ud in excess ol its fan > m . we derm ill 
prudent to offer guidance to the trial com t in apportioning those defense costs." Id. at 
140. Tlie court then, in essence, set out a two-part scheme for considering and 
d e u n u n i n g a p p : o ^ . - . ' -t. l e n • . • • * < • * ; - - . e u e n i l \ \ * : - n 
p;- -Moium.' deleave cosb among insurers, courts "'apply equitable principles . . . unless 
express policy language decrees the method of apportionment, ic ai 140 d;noting 
IMCkh'J (rn)up Inc. v Liberty Ana /-- » •> I <. .u.,\, . * - " !/t '^ M empnasis 
added) Coi lseqi lei ltly , i n ide i tl: ic tv < o pai t scl lei i ic: , a coi m t shoi lid :f ii st look to tl le 
policies to determine whether the language provides for a metliod of apportionment, atid 
then if there is no such language providing an apportionment meihod. u MJ.MIM esort to 
tl le secoi id pai t • :::>:(' t l i z scl: len ie of appb • ii ig eqi litable pi ii ic: {pais to deteri: :i lii ic: • tl: le i :i letl lod of 
apportionment. 
The court, in Sharon Si< d did not first examine the language of the insurance-
policies to determine a i i i c ; , . , e; apportionment as it appears thai [lie parties did mil 
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provide such information and/or did not make such arguments. Rather, the court began 
its analysis by considering the second part of the scheme, providing guidance to the trial 
court on remand in fashioning an equitable method of apportionment. Id. at 140. The 
court found that the most equitable method of apportionment for the facts of the case, 
involving a long period of continuing injury (disposal of hazardous waste) over multiple 
policies, was a time on the risk method, taking into account both the years on the risk and 
the policy limits of each insurance policy. The court also found that a certain amount or 
share of the defense costs should be allocated to the insured because it was "either self-
insured, uninsured, or for some other reason has no outside coverage" for many of the 
years (1908-1965) the insured was disposing hazardous waste at the property site. Id at 
141. 
2. Applying The Sharon Steel Decision To This Action. 
Following the decision in Sharon Steel, the Court in this case should first look to 
and consider whether the language of the insurance policies issued by Ohio Casualty and 
Unigard provide a method of sharing or apportioning of defense costs. The Ohio 
Casualty and Unigard Policies contain identical provisions entitled Other Insurance and 
Methods of Sharing (collectively "Other Insurance"), which address the circumstance of 
coverage under multiple policies of insurance and the sharing of the insurer's obligations. 
The provisions provide, in relevant part: 
7
 In footnote, the court explained that neither party in the case provided thorough 
briefing on the apportionment issue and "|w]e have therefore been limited to our own 
resources in fashioning an equitable apportionment method." Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d at 
140 fn. 18. 
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Other Insurance 
If other valid and collectible iiisuuince is a\ ailahK u> ihe insured for a loss 
we cover under Coverages A or B of this Co\ eragc Part, our obligations are 
limited as follows: 
a. Primary Insurance 
This insurance is primary except when b. below applies, it this insurance *> 
primary, our obligations are not affected unless any of the other insurance 
is also primary. Then, we will share with all that other insurance by the 
method describe in c. below. 
b Excess Insui ance 
^: % t * 
c. Method of Sharing 
If all of the other insurance permits contribution b\ equal shares, we wiii 
follow this method als(> IJnder this approach each insurer contributes 
equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limn nf insurance or none rf 
the loss remains, whichever comes first. 
AI >I : I A PP, v. 2, at 342-43, st :. .,• M - v F, / 5: \ il 924-25 1 1 it : Otl ler Ii i .i u < u: u :< : 
provision contained in both polii/ic plarnb and unambiguously provides that when other 
insurance twis available to the insured for a loss we cove? under Coverages A or B", then 
the metli-Ki ol apportionment is "coniiih;.*» \<>-w \*\ K\\\U\\ -mires . i nereiwrc. MI.V wur. 
tw oil ts: • <* . •- . -..!.:* . :;.. h-_ of" advertising 
injury as alleged u, ihc Edizonc Suit, there should iv w\- v-qual sphi of defense costs 
between Ohio Casualty anil I -miiard Accordingly, undei the .V/i,/<>// MCL! two-part 
schen le for ai laly zii ig appoi tioi n i iei it of defei ise costs, tl ic lai iguage of tl le Otl i zi 
Insurance provision decrees the method of sharing, showing the intent of the insurers to 
contractually coi i iinit to equal division of defense costs. 
25 
3. The Language Of The Other Insurance Provision Does Not Limited Its 
Application Solely To Circumstances In Which The Insurance Policies 
Have Concurrent/Overlapping Insurance. 
Ohio Casualty argues the Other Insurance provision only applies and is limited to 
the circumstance in which there are concurrent primary policies, which have overlapping 
insurance policy periods, and do not apply to successive primary insurance policies, as is 
the circumstance in this case. See Tenth Circuit Opening Aplt. Brief at pp. 16-22. That 
limited application is simply not supported by the expressed language of the Other 
Insurance provision. 
There is no language within the foregoing Other Insurance provision which restrict 
its application to the circumstance of concurrent/overlapping insurance only. The 
introductory paragraph provides: 
Other Insurance 
If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a 
loss we cover under Coverages A or B of this Coverage Part, our 
obligations are limited as follows . . . . 
APLT APP, v. 2, at 342 [Ohio Casualty Policy] and v. 5, at 924 [Unigard Policy] 
(emphasis added). That language describes the other insurance clearly and simply as 
insurance which is "available to the insured for a loss we cover under Coverages A or 
B". Id. (emphasis added). Other than the term "we"8, the policies do not specifically 
define any of the terms used in that phrase, such as the terms "loss" or "cover," and 
therefore those terms are accorded their usually accepted meaning under Utah law. See 
8
 The Policies defined the term "we" as: "The words 'we', 'us5 and 'our' refer to the 
company providing this insurance." APLT APP, v. 2, at 333 [Ohio Casualty Policy] and 
v. 5, at 912 [Unigard Policy]. 
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S. W. Energy v. Continental Ins. Co., 1999 UT 23, ^ 12, 974 P.2d 1239, 1242 ("Courts 
determine the legal import of insurance policies, affording the policy terms their usually 
accepted meanings and giving effect to and harmonizing to the extent possible all policy 
provisions."). The term "loss" is and has been defined as: 
Loss. Loss is a generic and relative term. It signifies the act 
of losing or the thing lost; it is not a work of limited, hard or 
fast meaning and has been held synonymous with, or 
equivalent to "damage", "damages", "deprivation", 
"detriment", "injury", and privation". Mason v. City of 
Albertville, 276 Ala 68, 158 So.2d 924, 927. 
* * % * 
The word loss in insurance policy in its common usage means 
a state of fact of being lost or destroyed, ruin or destruction. 
Sitzman v. National Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 133 Ind.App. 578, 
182N.E.2d448,450. 
Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Ed. 1990) at 945. The term "cover" is defined as: "Cover. 
To protect by means of insurance; sometimes orally pending issuance of policy." Id. at 
365. 
Under the foregoing meanings of the terms "loss" and "cover", the phrase "for a 
loss we cover" is a broad phrase encompassing all forms of injury, damage or loss 
covered by means of insurance (e.g. bodily injury/property damage and personal and 
advertising injury) which loss the insurer of the subject policy also covers; and such 
phrase does not limit or require the loss/injury to occur during the period of the policy. 
Therefore, the phrase "for loss we cover" encompasses both isolated incidents of 
injury/damage, triggering the circumstance of concurrent/overlapping coverage; and also 
encompasses a progressive or continuing type of injury/damage claim caused by a 
tortious offense continuing over a period of time, which spans and triggers successive 
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policy periods. The latter type of progressive or continuing injury/loss is particularly 
pertinent when allegations of advertising injury are made, as they were in the Edizone 
Suit. The term "Advertisement" is defined by the Policies as: 
"Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast or 
published to the general public or specific market segments 
about your goods, products or services for the purpose of 
attracting customers or supporters. 
APLT APP, v. 2, at 343 [Ohio Casualty Policy] and v. 5 at 925 [Unigard Policy]. 
Advertisement, as defined, can involve isolated events (e.g. placement of an ad in a 
magazine) or a continuous or stream-like events (e.g. website broadcast). Accordingly, 
the Policies do not state a specific temporal period in which the advertisement is deemed 
to have occurred or caused offense and therefore cover progressive/continuing loss/injury 
from continuous advertisement. 
The phrase describing other insurance as insurance which is "available to the 
insured for a loss we cover under Coverages A or B" does not have temporal 
restricting language and is therefore a general and broad phrase describing any insurance, 
whether concurrent, overlapping or successive, which is available to the insured that 
covers a loss also covered under Coverages A or B of the Insurance Policy. The 
language used in the Other Insurance provisions show an intent on the part of insurers to 
agree to equal methods of contribution between successive insurers, even if the insurers 
do not cover the exact same risk, but rather cover the same kind of risk which contributed 
to the overall covered loss/injury covered by both policies. Had the insurers meant to 
limit and restrict the application of the Other Insurance provision to circumstances of 
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overlapping and concurrent insurance policy periods only, as Ohio Casualty asserts, the 
provision should include temporal limiting language, such as: 
"If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the 
insured for an occurrence or offense we cover under 
Coverages A or B of this Coverage Part, our obligations are 
limited as follows . . . ." 
or, even more plainly, 
"If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the 
insured during the same period of time this insurance is in 
effect, and for an occurrence or offense we cover under 
Coverages A or B of this Coverage Part, our obligations are 
limited as follows 
The Insuring Agreements of the Policies temporally limit coverage for an "occurrence" 
and offenses" to occur during the policy period, but the Policies' Other Insurance 
provision does not temporally limit or require the "loss" to only occur during the policy 
period.9 The Other Insurance provision, therefore, clearly does not expressly provide 
limiting language as Ohio Casualty claims such that that the provision only applies to 
situations of concurrent/overlapping policies. Accordingly, in following the two part 
scheme for analyzing apportionment of defense costs under the Sharon Steel decision, the 
express policy language of the Insurance Policies involved in this matter decrees the 
method of apportionment of defense costs between successive insurers Ohio Casualty and 
Unigard. 
Indeed, the term "loss" is a term that is only used in the general liability portion of the 
Insurance Policies a few times in addition to its use in the Other Insurance Provision. For 
example the term "loss" is used when describing "loss of earnings" in the Supplementary 
Payment section of the Policies, and is used in the Policies when describing "loss of use" 
in relation to defining "property damage". APLT APP, v. 2, at 338 [Ohio Casualty 
Policy] and v. 5 at 920 [Unigard Policy]. 
29 
4. The Taco Bell Decision And Other Authorities Do Not Support A 
Finding By This Court That The Other Insurance Provisions Apply 
Only To Circumstances of Concurrent/Overlapping Insurance. 
Ohio Casualty cites to and relies upon the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 388 F.3d 1069 (7th Cir. 2004) and 
authorities cited therein, to support its claim of limited application of the Other Insurance 
provision. See Tenth Circuit Aplt. Brief at pp. 18-22. Ohio Casualty's reliance on the 
Taco Bell decision and other authorities supporting for the position that Other Insurance 
provisions have limited application to concurring/overlapping insurance is mistaken for a 
number of reasons. 
a. The Taco Bell Decision. 
Similar to the facts involved in this case, the Taco Bell case involved a declaratory 
judgment action to determine the duties of two successive liability insurers to provide 
defense to a fast food corporation for a suit brought against it by an advertising agency 
alleging misappropriation of an advertising campaign. Upon finding that both successive 
insurers owed a duty to defend the corporation, the United States Court of Appeals, 
Seventh Circuit, addressed the district court's finding of equal allocation of defense costs 
between the insurers. Taco Bell, 388 F.2d at 1078. 
As to the specific allocation of defense, one of the insurers, Continental, asserted 
that the allocation between the insurers should be based on the ratio of time on the risk by 
the insurers for the specific period of misappropriation, such that the other insurer, 
Zurich, would bear the brunt of the allocation of defense costs. The court rejected 
Continental's argument stating: 
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But such an allocation, which would assign the lion's share of 
the costs to Zurich, would be even more arbitrary than the 
district court's 50-50 split. Had Wrench sued only in respect 
to the misappropriation that occurred before October 7, 1997, 
it is entirely speculative what fraction of the defense costs 
that Taco Bell ultimately incurred in defending against the 
suit would have been incurred. Remember that while the later 
commercials contain misappropriations that the earlier ones 
did not, such as the hole-in-the-commercial idea, those 
commercials also repeat the basic misappropriation-the 
misappropriation of the idea of "Psycho Chihuahua" 
advertising campaign. Although Zurich's "prior publication" 
defense to its duty to defend Taco Bell from Wrench's suit 
has failed, probably most of the damages alleged by Wrench 
can be traced to what we are calling the basic 
misappropriation, which was published while Continental's 
policy was in force. 
Id. 
After rejecting Continental's apportionment scheme, the court pointed out a 
problem it saw with the district court's reliance upon the other insurance provisions to 
determine the allocation of defense costs. The court stated: 
If two insurers have identical other-insurance clauses in 
policies that cover the same risk, a common and deliciously 
simple solution is to divide the liability between them 50-50. 
But this analysis does not fit the case in which the two 
policies, each with an "other insurance" clause, insure merely 
the same kind of risk, but not the same risk because the 
policies are successive. To apply "other insurance" clauses in 
such a case would make insurers liable in part for occurrences 
outside the period covered by their policies. Douglas 
Richmond, "Issues and Problems in 'Other Insurance', 
Multiple Insurance and Self-Insurance," 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 
1373, 1376-77(1995). 
Id. at 1078-79. Even though the Seventh Circuit court pointed out the problem it saw 
with the district court's analysis of other insurance provisions, the court of appeals 
ultimately affirmed the district court's 50-50 allocation, as the best method before it. Id. 
There are a number of problems with Ohio Casualty's reliance on the Taco Bell 
decision to support its position that the Other Insurance provisions in this case do not 
apply to situations involving successive insurers. First, while the Taco Bell Court 
questions the application and use of an Other Insurance provision in apportioning defense 
costs among successive insurance policies, the court only analyzes the Other Insurance 
provision in the abstract and fails to consider and interpret the actual language of the 
Other Insurance provision. In this jurisdiction, the two-part scheme provided by the 
Sharon Steel decision requires an analysis of the language of the Insurance Policies to 
determine apportionment among the insurers. As shown in the prior section, "the plain 
language" of the Other Insurance provisions involved in this case apply to successive 
insurance policies and provide for the method of equal apportionment of defense costs 
between successive insurers Ohio Casualty and Unigard. 
Second, while the Taco Bell Court questions the application of the Other Insurance 
provision to successive insurance policies, it also acknowledges a split of authority in the 
courts as to application of the provision to successive insurance policies.: 
As if life weren't complicated enough, however, there is an argument for 
treating risks in separate periods as the same risk when a single tortious act 
continues in successive periods, see Continental Casualty Co. v. Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Federal Ins. Co. v. 
Cablevision Systems Development Co., 836 F.2d 54, 57-58 (2nd Cir. 1987). 
Taco Bell, 388 F3d at 1079. 
In Cablevision Systems, cited by the Taco Bell court, the United States Court of 
Appeals, Second Circuit, considered the apportionment of defense costs between three 
insurers who issued four successive CGL policies to the insured who was sued for alleged 
antitrust violations. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling of apportioning defense 
costs among the insurers equally and in doing so analyzed the Other Insurance provisions 
contained in the successive policies. The court ruled that "the 'other insurance' clauses 
in the instant case indicate an intent that contributions by the coinsurers to defense costs 
should be in equal amounts." Cablevision Systems, 836 F.2d at 58. The Cablevision 
Court also addressed a claim by one of the successive insurers that pro-rata division was 
the proper method of apportionment over the other insurance equal share method because 
two of the insurers were on coverage longer or at a bigger policy limit that the arguing 
insurer. To that claim, the court stated: 
The First Circuit in Aviles v. Burgos, 783 F.2d 270 (1 Cir. 
1986), rejected a similar argument for pro rata contribution of 
liability for indemnity losses. There, the insurance policies 
contained the identical "other insurance" clauses as the three 
CGL policies in the instant case. The court held that, based 
on the language of the policies, the proper method of 
apportionment between the insurers should be in equal shares. 
The court stated " CIS [the insurer] took the risk that such 
arrangement might not always be to its benefit when it 
included such language in the policy." Aviles, supra, 783 
F.2d at 282. We agree. 
Cablevision Systems, 836 F.2d at 60 (emphasis added). 
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Lastly, while the Taco Bell Court questioned the use and application of the Other 
Insurance provision in cases of successive insurance, it ultimately affirmed the lower 
court's 50/50 allocation as the most attractive method of apportionment: 
We need not chase this particular hare to ground [the 
application of other insurance provisions to successive 
policies], however, as the parties have not suggested any 
better method of dividing the costs between the two 
insurance companies in the circumstances of utter 
uncertainty prevailing here than doing so 50-50. 
Continental's proposed "time on the risk" allocation is even 
less attractive, for the reason indicated earlier, that most of 
Wrench's damages probably stemmed from the 
republication of the basic idea for the Psycho Chihuahua 
advertising campaign. So we won't disturb the district 
court's allocation. 
Id. Accordingly, the Taco Bell decision, once analyzing its opinion completely, does not 
support Ohio Casualty's request for the Court to reverse the district court's equal 
apportionment of defense costs between Ohio Casualty and Unigard. 
b. Other Authorities Supporting And Rejecting The Proposition 
That Other Insurance Provisions Only Apply To Circumstances 
Of Concurrent/Overlapping Insurance 
As set out by the Tenth Circuit in its Order requesting, there is split among courts 
and other authorities regarding whether Other Insurance provisions are limited to risks 
covered by concurrent/overlapping policies,10 or whether other insurance provision apply 
to risks of the same kind covered in separate successive policies when the loss/injury 
10
 See Taco Bell, 388 F.3d at 1078-79; St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vigilant Ins. 
Co., 919 F.2d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 1990); Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in 
"Other Insurance, " Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insurance, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 1373, 1376-
77 (1995); Michael G. Doherty, Comment, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability 
Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 278 (1997). 
1A 
continues over successive periods.11 Addendum, Tenth Circuit Order, dated April 28, 
2009 at 9 (Exhibit "B").12 From a review of the cases and authorities finding that other 
insurance provisions have limited application to only concurrent/overlapping policies, the 
central basis for their conclusion is that successive insurers do not insure the same risk 
and such application would unjustly make consecutive insurers "liable in part for 
occurrences outside the period covered by their policies." See Douglas R. Richmond, 
Issues and Problems, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. at 1376-77. The flaw in that analysis is that 
neither the courts nor the scholars appear to have carefully analyzed and construed the 
language of the other insurance provisions, nor considered the provisions' language in the 
context of the specific loss/injury. They have only considered the concept in the abstract 
as to the general notice of an insurer's intent to only cover claims falling within the 
policy period. As shown in Section A.2 of this Brief, analysis of the language of the 
Other Insurance Provisions in this case yields the result that the provisions apply to the 
successive insurance policies of Ohio Casualty and Unigard, particularly given the 
advertising injury alleged in the Edizone Suit. Moreover, while the notion appears sound 
that insurers would not intend to make themselves liable for damages occurring outside 
See Cablevision, 836 F.2d at 58; Wooddale Builders, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 722 
N.W.2d 283, 304 (Minn. 2006). 
Since the Tenth Circuit Order requesting certification, an additional court has weigh 
in on the issue. See Boston Gas Company v. Century Ind. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 308 
(Mass. 2009) (finding that the policies' other insurance clauses do not reflect an intention 
to cover losses from damage outside the policy period.); but see also Emhart Ind. v. 
Century Ind. Co., 359 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2009) (in rejecting an insurer's attempt to limit 
defense costs to the "during the policy" language of the policy, the court stated: u[t]here 
is no connection between limiting coverage by the policy period and the amount of 
defense of defense costs, which weighs strongly against reading the Policies in the way 
that Century proposes.") (emphasis within). 
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their policy period, such notion ignores the law and circumstance that if the insurer owe a 
duty to defend one claim alleged in the complaint, they have a duty to defend all claims 
alleged in the complaint. Accordingly, with respect to defense duties, insurers often 
provide defense coverage for claims falling outside of the policy coverage. See 
discussion infra Section B. 
In light of the foregoing, the Court should answer the certified question, finding 
that the defense costs incurred in defending the Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone 
Suit should be allocated between Ohio Casualty and Unigard under the "equal shares" 
method set forth in the Other Insurance provisions contained in the Ohio Casualty and 
Unigard Policies. 
B. Utah's Law Regarding An Insurer's Duty To Defend Justifies Apportioning 
Defense Costs By Equal 50/50 Shares Between Ohio Casualty and Unigard. 
In addition to finding that the Other Insurance provision provides for an equal 
share method of apportioning defense costs between Ohio Casualty and Unigard, Judge 
Campbell found that the general rule that an insurer owes a duty to defend all claims 
alleged in a suit also justifies apportionment of defense costs equally between Ohio 
Casualty and Unigard. In doing so, the district court relied on and cited to the recent 
ruling in the case of Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, 140 P.2d 1210. The 
district court's ruling in regards to the Benjamin Decision's declaration is correct, and 
provides further justification for finding that the defense costs should be allocated 
between Ohio Casualty and Unigard under an "equal shares" method set forth in the 
Other Insurance provisions. 
1. Utah Law Regarding The Duty To Defend 
Under Utah law, "an insurer's duty to defend is broader than its duty to 
indemnify." Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d at 133 {citing Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc, v. 
United States Fid & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986). The duty to defend is 
broader than the duty to indemnify in several respects. First, the duty to defend arises 
when the "insurer ascertains facts giving rise to potential liability under the insurance 
policy." Id. In order words, an insurer has a duty to defend "even if.. . the insurer is 
ultimately not liable to indemnify the insured." Fire Ins. Exch. v. Estate ofTherkelsen, 
27 P.3d 555, 560 (Utah 2001). 
Second, an insurer has a duty to defend "even if the allegations in the suit are 
groundless, false, or fraudulent." Deseret Federal, 714 P.2d at 1147. Therefore, the duty 
to defend exists regardless of whether the plaintiff can prove the merits of their claim. 
See id. (an insurer cannot "simply say, cWe don't believe the plaintiff can prove what he 
is alleging.'"). 
Third, the duty to defend one claim creates a duty on the part of the insurer to 
defend all claims alleged in the underlying suit. See Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 
2006 UT 37, \ 25, 140 P.3d 1210. This part of an insurer's defense duties provides, in 
particular, justification and support for apportioning the defense costs equally between 
Ohio Casualty and Unigard, as co-insurers of the Cloud Nine Defendants. 
2. The Benjamin Decision 
In Benjamin, a case involving questions of insurance coverage for claims of 
negligent and intentional sexual misconduct on the part of the insured, the Utah Supreme 
in 
Court explained an insurer's defense obligation in relation to a circumstance where there 
is only one covered claim (negligent infliction of emotion distress) alleged in the lawsuit. 
The court stated: 
Because Arnica owed a duty to defend the negligent infliction 
of emotional distress claims, Arnica owed a duty to defend all 
of the claims brought by Borthick and Allen. u[W]hen there 
is covered and non-covered claims in the same lawsuit, the 
insurer is obligated to provide a defense to the entire suit, at 
least until it can limit the suit to those claims outside of the 
policy coverage." Appleman on Insurance Law and Practice 
§ 136.2[D] (2d ed. 2006); see also Mt. Airy Ins. Co. v. 
Greenbaum, 127 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[I]f an insurer 
has a duty to defend one count of a complaint, it must defend 
them all."). 
Benjamin, 2006 UT 37 at f 25; see also Overthrust v. Home Ins. Co , 676 F.Supp. 1086, 
1091 (D. Utah 1987) ("insurer must defend all claims brought at the same time, even if 
some of the claims are not covered by the policy."). 
Under the Benjamin Court's declaration, Unigard and Ohio Casualty each owe an 
equal duty to the Cloud Nine Defendants to provide a defense to all of the claims alleged 
in the Edizone Suit. That defense includes: [1] defense of causes of action which are not 
covered by the contractual terms of the policies (e.g. claims of patent infringement as 
excluded from coverage by the Policies); [2] defense of claims statutorily prohibited from 
coverage (e.g. punitive damages, see Utah Code Ann. § 31A-20-101 (2005) (uNo insurer 
may insure or attempt to insured against... (4) punitive damages.")) and; [3] defense of 
claims not covered because they occurred before and/or after the effective dates of the 
policy periods of the insurance policies (e.g. for Ohio Casualty alleged conduct of the 
Cloud Nine Defendants occurring after June 10, 2002 and for Unigard alleged conduct of 
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the Cloud Nine Defendants occurring before December 12, 2002). See APLT APP, v. 1, 
at 54-103 [Complaint] and v. 10, at 1577-1622 [Second Amended Complaint]. Since 
both insurers owe the duty to defend all claims alleged in the Edizone Suit, whether or 
not the claims are actually covered by one or the other insurer's policy, their respective 
duty to defend is exactly the same and equal; and consequently their share in paying for 
the defense should be equal. 
A number of courts from around the nation have considered and/or relied on the 
basic tenet of an insurer's duty to defend all claims to find that apportionment of defense 
costs should be divided equally among insurers. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Vigilant Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1990); Federal Ins. Co. v. Cablevision 
Systems Development Co, 836 F.2d 54, 58 (2n Cir. 1987); Wooddale Builder, Inc. v. 
Maryland Cas. Co., 772 N.W.2d 283 (Minn. 2006); Texas Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. 
Assoc, v. Southwest Aggregates, Inc., 982 S.W.2d 600, 606 (Tx. Ct. App. 1999); Ames v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 340 S.E.2d 479 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986). In Cablevision, the Second 
Circuit explained the basis for equal sharing of defense costs: "Under New York Law, the 
duty of each of the three insurers to defend Cablevision is separate and equal. Since the 
insurers cannot defend 'part' of the antitrust claims in the underlying Nishimura action, it 
is logical that the insurers bear the costs of defense equally." Cablevision, 836 F.2d at 
58. 
Accordingly, the Benjamin Court's declaration that an insurer has a duty to defend 
all claims alleged in a suit creates equal duties to defend for insurers whose policies have 
been triggered, thereby justifying an apportionment of defense costs on a equal basis 
between the insurers. 
3. Ohio Casualty's Asserted Method Of Apportionment Of Defense Costs 
Is Contrary To Utah's Law Regarding An Insurer's Duty to Defend. 
Ohio Casualty argues that since the Benjamin case does not involve the issue of 
apportionment of defense, its ruling cannot be used to avoid applying the time on the risk 
apportionment as adopted in the Sharon Steel decision. See Tenth Circuit Opening Aplt. 
Brief at pp. 24-26. Ohio Casualty is mistaken. 
As previously demonstrated, the Benjamin decision's declaration that an insurer 
owes a duty to defend all claims provides additional justification for equal apportionment 
of defense costs. Moreover, the Benjamin declaration of a duty to defend all claims also 
demonstrates how untenable Ohio Casualty's time on the risk method of apportionment 
of defense costs is in this action. 
Ohio Casualty advocates that the Court should apportion defense costs based on 
how many months the respective insurers and the insured were on the risk. Since the 
Cloud Nine Defendants' alleged wrongdoing began upon termination of the License 
Agreement on March 11, 2002, Ohio Casualty claims that its defense responsibility and 
share of defense costs should be for three months, from March 11, 2002 to June 10, 2002, 
when the policy it issued to the Cloud Nine Defendants expired. Next, Ohio Casualty 
claims that the Cloud Nine Defendants should contribute and share in the defense costs 
based on a period of six months in which it was uninsured from June 11, 2002 to 
December 12, 2002. Lastly, Unigard should contribute and share in the defense costs 
for a period of the remaining time based on the months it insured the Cloud Nine 
Defendants from December 12, 2002 to December 12, 2005. Accordingly, that method 
of months on the risk computes to the following division of defense costs: 
Ohio Casualty 3/45ths ( 6.6%) 
The Cloud Nine Defendants 6/45ths (13.3%) 
Unigard 36/45ths (80.0%) 
Such method of apportionment of defense costs essentially argues for adoption of a rule 
that an insurer has a duty to defend only those claims covered by its insurance policy. 
That rule "is directly contrary to Utah case law, which requires an insurer to defend [all] 
covered and non-covered claims" in a lawsuit. Benjamin, 2006 UT 37 at f^ 25. 
Consequently, while the Benjamin decision does not address apportionment of 
defense costs between insurers, its declaration that insurers are obligated to defend all 
claims alleged in a suit (covered and non-covered claims) is relevant to this case and 
provides justification and rationale for adopting an equal share method of apportionment 
between Ohio Casualty and Unigard in this case. 
4. The Benjamin And The Sharon Steel Decisions. 
Lastly, Ohio Casualty asserts that in relying upon the Benjamin decision as a basis 
for ruling for equal apportionment of defense costs in this case, this Court will reject the 
ruling in the Sharon Steele decision. Again, Ohio Casualty is mistaken. 
Unigard understands that the Cloud Nine Defendants were uninsured for that period of 
time because Ohio Casualty made the decision to cease underwriting insurance for 
businesses like Cloud Nine (Ohio Casualty timely provided notice of that decision to no 
longer underwrite). The Cloud Nine Defendants did not find replacement coverage until 
Unigard issued a policy to them in December 2002. 
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The Sharon Steel decision does not, as Ohio Casualty asserts, require or mandate 
that Utah courts apply a "time on the risk" formula in all cases to determine the 
apportionment of defense costs between insurers. Rather, the Sharon Steel Court 
addressed the topic of apportionment as "guidance" for the trial court in apportioning 
defense costs for that specific case, which: (1) involved disposal of hazardous waste over 
decades, (2) involved a number of insurers insuring numerous policies periods (1966-
1980), and (3) involved a long period of time in which the insured had no insurance or no 
evidence of insurance (1908-1965). See Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d 130-31. Under those 
facts, the Sharon Steel court analyzed various methods for equitable apportionment of 
defense costs and found that a time on the risk/policy limits formula, which allocates 
defense costs among the insurers and also to the insured because of the long period of 
time it was not insured, was the equitable method of allocation of defense costs for that 
case. Id. at 141-42. The Sharon Steel court did not in any way rule, however, that the 
guidance it set forth in its decision should apply to every case of apportionment of 
defense costs.14 
Moreover, the facts of the Sharon Steel case are very different and distinguishable 
from the facts before the Court in this action. Unlike the facts in the Sharon Steel case, 
14
 Indeed, the Sharon Steel Court recognizes that the principles which it set forth in its 
decision may not be a workable formula for application by the trial court. In footnote, the 
Court stated: 
We recognize that the principles set forth in this opinion may not lend 
themselves to simple and straightforward application to the factual 
circumstances of this case. We therefore grant considerable discretion to the 
trial court in devising a formula which best reflects our decision. 
Id. at 142 fn. 22. 
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this action involves two insurers in which their policies contain identical Other Insurance 
provisions providing for equal share contribution between the insurers for a loss each 
covers. That policy language, unlike the facts in the Sharon Steel case, shows the intent 
on the part of the insurers to defend the insured in a manner consistent with the general 
principles of insurance law, which includes the principle that an insurer owes a duty to 
defend all claims, such that multiple insurers have an equal duty to defend all claims. 
Had Ohio Casualty meant to limit its duty to defend to something less than a duty to 
defend all claims when there is other insurance available, it needed to state that limitation 
in a clear and unambiguous way within its policy. See Novell, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 
141 F.2d 983, 986 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Language limiting an insurer's duty to defend an 
insured must be clear, unambiguous, and sufficiently conspicuous in order to give proper 
notice to the insured of the limitations on the duty to defend.") (quoting Simmons v. 
Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Ohio Casualty did not 
state or place such a limitation on its duty to defend in its policy. 
Additionally, while in this case the insured has a period of time of six months in 
which it was not insured, that period of time is very different from the facts found in the 
Sharon Steel case in which the insured did not have insurance (or evidence of insurance) 
for a period of 50+ years. Given the amount of years of not being insured (50+ years), as 
compared to the amount of years of being insured (14 years), it is understandable that the 
Sharon Steel court found that it was equitable to apportion defense costs to the insured. 
The facts in this action, as shown above, do not merit apportionment of defense costs to 
the Cloud Nine Defendants and do not merit a disregard of the duty to defend all claims 
principle. 
Accordingly, the Sharon Steel decision is distinguishable from this action, and the 
Court will not contravene its holding by ruling that equal (50/50) apportionment of 
defense costs between Ohio Casualty and Unigard is proper in this action. The Court 
should, therefore, answer the certified question, finding that the defense costs incurred in 
defending the Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit should be allocated between 
Ohio Casualty and Unigard under the "equal shares" method set forth in the Other 
Insurance provisions contained in the Ohio Casualty and Unigard Policies. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellee, Unigard Insurance Company, 
respectfully requests that this Court to answer the certified question, finding that the 
defense costs incurred in defending the Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit 
should be allocated between Ohio Casualty and Unigard under the "equal shares" method 
set forth in the Other Insurance provisions contained in the Ohio Casualty and Unigard 
Policies. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY and WEST AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants, 
vs. 
CLOUD NINE, LLC, et al., 
Defendants. 
UNIGARD INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Intervenor and Cross-
Claimant. 
ORDER 
AND 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. L05-CV-88TC 
The parties seek a ruling regarding the scope of two insurance companies7 duty to defend 
the Cloud Nine Defendants in the separate case of Edizone LC v. Cloud Nine LLC, Case No. 
L04-CV-117-TS (D. Utah). One of the insurance companies, Unigard Insurance Company, 
agreed to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants in Edizone, whereas the other insurance company, 
The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, rejected the Cloud Nine Defendants' initial tender of 
defense. Unigard, in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, contends that Ohio Casualty, 
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like Unigard, has a duty to defend.1 Unigard further contends that Ohio Casualty should share 
equally in paying the costs that Unigard has incurred (or will incur) defending the Edizone case. 
The court finds that the allegations in Edizone's Complaint allege an advertising injury 
triggering a duty to defend on the part of Ohio Casualty and Unigard. Also, based on the 
language of the Ohio Casualty and Unigard policies, the court finds that Ohio Casualty must pay 
fifty percent of the Cloud Nine Defendants' defense costs in Edizone, with Unigard paying the 
remaining fifty percent. Accordingly, Unigard's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED. 
L FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 
Unigard insured the Cloud Nine Defendants for a portion of the period at issue in the 
Edizone case, and it accepted the Cloud Nine Defendants' tender of defense under a reservation 
of rights when Edizone was filed in August 2004. Ohio Casualty also insured the Cloud Nine 
Defendants for a portion of the relevant period, but it rejected their initial tender of defense. 
Ohio Casualty then filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that it has neither a 
duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify the Cloud Nine Defendants. Unigard intervened as a 
plaintiff, contending that it also does not have a duty to defend or indemnify, but if it does, then 
'West American Insurance Company is also a plaintiff in this declaratory judgment 
action. But because no one claims that West American has a duty to defend, it is not part of the 
motion before the court. (See Unigard's Mem. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. at p. 20 n.3 
("Unigard finds that the Edizone Suit does not allege a covered advertising injury against the 
Cloud Nine Defendants which occurred during the effective periods of the insurance policies 
issued by West American (June 1998 through June 2001), and therefore does not claim that West 
American has a duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants.").) 
2No disputed facts exist (indeed, the analysis is based on allegations in Edizone's 
Complaint and the policy language). The court will discuss the facts throughout the Order as 
necessary to provide context and analyze the legal issues. 
2 
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so does Ohio Casualty because the policies are essentially identical.3 Additionally, Unigard 
seeks a finding that if both insurers have a duty to defend, Ohio Casualty must share equally in 
paying defense costs (incurred and to be incurred). 
It is important to note that after Unigard filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Ohio Casualty agreed to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants under a reservation of rights, based 
on what it believes are materially new allegations in the Second Amended Complaint filed in 
Edizone. Because Ohio Casualty has since acknowledged a duty to defend from the date of 
Edizone's Second Amended Complaint (filed in January 2006), the duty-to-defend issue raised 
by Unigard's Motion is narrowed to whether Ohio Casualty owed a duty to defend before the 
Second Amended Complaint was filed. 
A. The Insurance Policy 
Ohio Casualty issued a Commercial General Liability Policy to Cloud Nine, LLC, and 
Easy Seat, LLC, for the period of June 10, 2001, to June 10, 2002. (Ohio Casualty Policy No. 
BKO (02) 52 34 34 82, attached as Ex. A to Decl. of Rebecca Hill.) The Policy provided 
coverage for "'Personal and Advertising Injury Liability71 (Coverage B), as follows: 
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of "personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance 
applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any "suit" 
seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured 
against any "suit" seeking damages for "personal and advertising injury" to which 
this insurance does not apply.. . . 
(Id. at p. 5 of CGL Coverage Form (emphasis added).) According to the Policy, "personal and 
3Unigard's Motion addresses only the duty to defend, not the duty to indemnify. Both 
Unigard and Ohio Casualty contend that no duty to indemnify exists under their respective 
policies. But that is an issue for another day. 
3 
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advertising injury" is an "injury . . . arising out of one or more of the following offenses: . . . [t]he 
use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement' " (Id. at p. 13 (emphasis 
added).) "Advertisement" is defined as "a notice that is broadcast or published to the general 
public or specific market segments about your goods, products or services for the purpose of 
attracting customers or supporters." (Id. at p. 1L) 
The Policy also contains certain exclusions. In particular, the insurance policy does not 
apply to "personal or advertising injury" that was "caused by or at the direction of the insured 
with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict 'personal 
and advertisement injury'" or that arose "out of oral or written publication of materials, if done 
by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity." (Id. at p. 5 (emphasis 
added).)4 
B. Edizone's Complaint 
The genesis of the Edizone suit is the alleged breach of a License Agreement allowing the 
Cloud Nine Defendants to manufacture, use and sell patented elastomer gel technology and 
product known as "Gelastic," kCGelIyComb," and ^Intelli-Gel" (another name for "GellyComb"). 
In its initial complaint,5 Edizone asserts causes of action for (1) patent infringement; (2) breach 
4Coverage B of the Unigard Policy provides liability insurance coverage for personal and 
advertising injury. The insuring provision of Coverage B of the Unigard Policy is identical to 
insuring provision of Coverage B of the Ohio Casualty Policy. (See Unigard Policy CGL 
Coverage Form at p. 6, attached as Ex. B to Declaration of Rebecca L. Hill.) The definition of 
"Personal and Advertising Injury" contained in the Unigard Policy is also identical to the Ohio 
Casualty Policy. (See id. at p. 17.) And the definition of "advertisement" and policy exclusions 
in both policies are the same in all relevant aspects. (See id. at pp. 6-7, 14.) Accordingly, the 
court's ruling on the duty to defend extends to Unigard as well. 
5As noted above, only the allegations of Edizone's original Complaint (or First Amended 
Complaint, which adds defendants but does not change the allegations (see Ex. F attached to Hill 
4 
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of contract; (3) constructive fraud; (4) fraudulent non-disclosure; (5) federal law trademark 
infringement; (6) common law trade name infringement or common law unfair competition; 
(7) deceptive trade practices under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act; (8) misrepresentation and 
false designation of origin under the federal trademark act; and (9) conspiracy. (See Edizone 
Complaint, attached as Ex. E to Hill Deck) 
According to Unigard, Edizone's Complaint triggers a duty to defend under the 
"advertising injury" portion of the Policy because it alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants used 
Edizone's "advertising ideas" (the trade names GellyComb, Gelastic, and Intelli-Gel) in their 
advertisement, all to Edizone's detriment Unigard focuses on Edizone's Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eighth causes of action to argue that Edizone's allegations trigger Ohio Casualty's duty to defend 
under the Policy's Coverage B for "personal and advertising injury" liability. 
In its Complaint, Edizone describes its Sixth Cause of Action as "Common Law Trade 
Name Infringement [and] Common Law Unfair Competition." It alleges that the Cloud Nine 
Defendants "have adopted and taken for themselves the use of Edizone's valuable trade names 
[GellyComb, Gelastic, and/or Intelli-Gel] by using said names in their businesses, on their 
websites, and in conjunction with their goods. . . ." (Edizone Compl. ^ 103, attached as Ex. E to 
Declaration of Rebecca L. Hill.) Edizone further alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants' use of 
those trade names constitutes "common law trade name infringement and unfair competition and 
is designed to cause confusion and mistake and to deceive purchasers into believing that 
Defendants' products are somehow sponsored by, made by, or associated with Edizone." (Id.) 
Deck)) are relevant. The court does not consider the allegations of Edizone's Second Amended 
Complaint, because Ohio Casualty has agreed to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants from the 
date the Second Amended Complaint was filed. 
5 
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Edizone contends that, "(a]s a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, Edizone will 
suffer, and has suffered, injury to its trade names and its established good will in the market. 
Defendants' acts, misconduct, and misappropriation of Edizone's trade names are also likely to 
cause confusion, mistake, and deceive the public, and have already caused actual confusion. 
Such injuries are irreparable injuries for which there is no adequate remedy at law." (Id. ^ 105.) 
Under Edizone's Seventh Cause of Action, the Cloud Nine Defendants are accused of 
violating the Utah Truth in Advertising Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-1 la-3, which "prohibits 
persons and companies from engaging in deceptive trade practices." (Id. 11 108.) Edizone alleges 
that the Cloud Nine Defendants ''engaged in many of the deceptive trade practices enumerated in 
[§ 13-1 la-3], including . . . the causing of confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, 
sponsorship, approval, or certification of their goods or services; or . . . the causing of confusion 
or misunderstanding as to their affiliation, connection, association with, or certification by 
Edizone." (Id.) 
And, finally, Edizone's Eighth Cause of Action alleges "Misrepresentation and False 
Designation of Origin" under 15 U.S.C § 1125(a). According to Edizone, the Cloud Nine 
Defendants "appropriated the names GellyComb, Gelastic and/or Intelli-Gel and are using [the 
names] in their own businesses . . . in a prominent fashion." (kf [^ 110.) In particular, Edizone 
alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants "use the above trade names to get people to their 
businesses, where competing products are advertised and sold using said trade name."6 (IdL 
1 1 1 3 . ) 
6The full set of allegations may be found in Edizone's Complaint (in particular, 
paragraphs 101 -114), which is attached as Exhibit E to the Declaration of Rebecca L. Hill. 
6 
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C. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the entry of summary judgment if "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998). 
Unigard's Motion involves the interpretation of two insurance contracts and a 
determination of the insurers' rights and obligations under those contracts. Utah law (which 
applies in this diversity action) provides that insurance contracts aare interpreted under general 
contract principles" and that interpretation of such contracts is a question of law to be determined 
by the courts. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 46 F.3d 1005, 1008 (10th Cir. 1995); see also 
Morris v. Mountain Tel. & Tel., 658 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Utah 1983) ("When the existence of a 
contract and the identity of the parties are not in issue and when the contract provisions are clear 
and complete, the meaning of the contract can appropriately be resolved by the court on summary 
judgment."). Moreover, in Utah, as a general rule, "an insurer's duty to defend is determined by 
comparing the language of the insurance policy with the allegations of the complaint." Fire Ins. 
Exch. v. Estate of Therkelsen, 27 P.3d 555 (Utah 2001). Accordingly, the question of whether 
the insurers have a duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants and the question of how defense 
costs should be allocated are questions of law. Partial summary judgment on the issues presented 
by Unigard's Motion is appropriate at this time.7 
7Ohio Casualty filed a Rule 56(f) motion seeking a continuance until certain discovery 
could be conducted. The court denied that motion from the bench during the hearing. 
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IL DUTY TO DEFEND 
A duty to defend arises "when the insurer ascertains facts giving rise to potential liability 
under the insurance policy." Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 
1997). When the allegations, if proven, show "there is no potential liability [under the policy], 
then there is no duty to defend." Deseret Fed. Sav. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar., 714 P.2d 1143, 1147 
(Utah 1986). Under Utah law, the court must interpret the insurance policy as it would any 
written contract, under general contract interpretation principles. Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. 
Co., 140 P.3d 1210, 1213 (Utah 2006). If one claim or allegation triggers the duty to defend, the 
insurer must defend all claims (that is, covered and non-covered claims), at least until the suit is 
limited to the non-covered claims. Id at 1216. Finally, and perhaps most important: "'When in 
doubt, defend.'" l± at 1215 (quoting Appleman on Ins. Law & Practice § 136.2[C] (2d ed. 
2006)). 
A. The Novell Two-Part Test 
Utah state court decisions have not construed "advertising injury" language in insurance 
policies. But the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has established a two-part test to determine 
whether an advertising injury is alleged, and, consequently, a duty to defend is triggered. See 
Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 1998). Under that test, the court must first 
determine whether the complaint alleges a "predicate offense," that is, "one of the offenses 
specifically listed in the [Policy's] definition of'advertising injury.'" IcL at 986. If the first part 
of the test is satisfied, then the court must examine whether there is a causal connection between 
the alleged injuries and the advertising activities. Id. 
Applying the Novell two-part test for establishing an "advertising injury" to the Edizone 
8 
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case, the court finds that the allegations set forth in Edizone's Complaint satisfy the two-part test 
and trigger a duty to defend under the policies issued by Ohio Casualty and Unigard. 
1. Part One of the Novell Test 
First, Edizone's Complaint alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants committed the 
predicate offense of'use of another's [Edizone's] advertising idea in your [Cloud Nine's] 
'advertisement.'" (See Policy at p.3.) Neither the Policy nor Novell define "advertising idea." 
But courts from other jurisdictions have done so. An 'advertising idea" is an "idea for calling 
public attention to a product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable qualities so as to 
increase sales or patronage." Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Badger Med. Supply Co., 528 N.W.2d 
486, 490 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (applying ordinary meaning to term "advertising idea"); see also 
Walk v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 852 A.2d 98, 109 (Md. Ct. App. 2004) (suggesting that 
advertising ideas are "discrete images or text in an advertisement"); Transportation Ins. Co. v. 
Freedom Elec, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (an advertising idea is"£any 
idea or concept related to the promotion of a product to the public'") (quoting Hyman v. 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 1179, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)). The discrete trade names 
of GellyComb, Gelastic, and Intelli-Gel expressly describe and promote the gel-like and elastic 
qualities of the material, calling the public's attention to the desirable qualities of Edizone's 
products. Those trade names are "advertising ideas" as that phrase is understood by the average, 
reasonable purchaser of insurance. See Draughton v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 771 P.2d 1105, 
1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (when interpreting insurance contract, court should construe policy as 
it "would be understood by the average, reasonable purchaser of insurance"); Utah Power & 
Light Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 1549, 1559 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Utah law and 
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citing Draughton for same proposition). 
Courts also find that where there is no exclusion specific to trademark (as is the case in 
Ohio Casualty's Policy), the phrase "advertising idea" is a broad enough term to include and 
provide coverage for trademark infringement. See, e.g., State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Travelers Indem. Co. of Amer., 343 F.3d 249, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that "vast majority" 
of courts conclude that trademark infringement falls within advertising injury coverage for 
misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business); CAT Internet Servs., Inc. v. 
Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 333 F.3d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 2003) (use of trademarks in connection 
with marketing and sales for the purpose of gaining customers constitutes misappropriation of 
advertising idea); Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 749 (3d 
Cir. 1999) ("A trademark can be seen as an 'advertising idea': It is a way of marking goods so 
that they will be identified with a particular source... . [Allegations of trademark infringement 
arguably allege misappropriation of an advertising idea."); Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. StunFence, 
Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1079 (N.D. 111. 2003) (finding duty to defend against trademark 
infringement claim under policy language covering liability for "use of another's advertising 
idea"). See also Novell, 141 F.3d at 985 ("'Ambiguities in an insurance contract are construed 
against the insurer.'") (interpreting Utah law) (citation omitted). 
Certainly Edizone has alleged "use" of those advertising ideas in the Cloud Nine 
Defendants' advertisements.8 For example, Edizone alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants used 
8To the extent that cases cited by Ohio Casualty hold that "misappropriation of an 
advertising idea" does not encompass trademark infringement claims, the court finds those cases 
distinguishable because the Policy here contains the common term "use," which is broader than 
"misappropriation." See also Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. StunFence, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 
1079 (N.D. Ill 2003) (distinguishing decisions limiting "misappropriation of advertising idea" to 
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Edizone7s trade names "in their businesses, on their websites," they "compete directly with 
Edizone in the same markets" and such conduct "is designed to cause confusion and mistake and 
to deceive purchasers into believing that Defendants' products are somehow sponsored by, made 
by, or associated with Edizone." (Edizone Compl. at ^ 103.) A business's website, except for 
the web pages concerning the business's contact information and history, is generally an 
advertisement for the business's goods, services or products. And certainly a website would fall 
within the Policy's definition of "advertisement": "a notice that is broadcast or published to the 
general public or specific market segments about your goods, products or services for the purpose 
of attracting customers or supporters." (Policy at p. 11.) Also, Edizone alleges under its claim 
for Misrepresentation and False Origin that the Cloud Nine Defendants used the trade names 
Intelli-Gel, GellyComb, and Gelastic ' to get people to their businesses, where competing 
products are advertised and sold using" those trade names. (Edizone Compl. f 22.) In claiming 
that the Cloud Nine Defendants unlawfully used Edizone's trade names on their websites, 
Edizone is claiming use of Edizone's advertising ideas in Cloud Nine's advertisements. 
Moreover, Edizone alleges a claim under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act, which 
specifically requires allegations of deceptive trade practices occurring in advertising. "The 
purpose of [the Utah Truth in Advertising Act] is to prevent deceptive, misleading, and false 
advertising practices and forms in Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 13-1 la-1. Clearly, the crux of a 
cause of action for violation of the Utah Truth in Advertising Act is advertising. 
In short, the Edizone allegations fall within the definition of advertising injury as the 
common law tort of misappropriation in part because the policy at issue in StunFence employed 
the word "use," not "misappropriation"). 
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offense of "use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement,"' and the first part of the 
Novell test is satisfied. 
2. Part Two of the NoveH Test 
The second part of the Novell test is also met because Edizone's Complaint alleges a 
causal connection between Edizone's injuries and the Cloud Nine Defendants' advertising 
activities. Edizone alleges that it has suffered injury to its trade names as a result of the Cloud 
Nine Defendants' misconduct and it expressly seeks relief prohibiting the Cloud Nine 
Defendants from using the trade names and trademarks on their websites, in advertising or in any 
other way. Those claims show the causal connection between Edizone's alleged injury from the 
Cloud Nine Defendants' use of Edizone's advertising ideas in its advertisements. Cloud Nine's 
advertising activities "caused [Edizone's] injury-not merely exposed it." See Novell, 141 F_3d 
at 989. 
3. "When in doubt, defend." 
Even if the court were to find that Edizone's Complaint presents factual questions or an 
uncertainty regarding whether an advertising injury is alleged, the insurers still have a duty to 
defend until those uncertainties are resolved. "Where factual questions render coverage 
uncertain,... the insurer must defend until those uncertainties can be resolved against coverage. 
c
 When in doubt, defend.'" Benjamin, 140 P.3d at 1215 (quoting Appleman on Ins. Law & 
Practice § 136.2[C] (2d ed. 2006)). 
B. Policy Exclusions 
Ohio Casualty argues that it owes no duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants because 
the allegations in Edizone's Complaint fall within two different intentional act exclusions in the 
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Ohio Casualty Policy According to those exclusions, the Policy does not apply to personal and 
advertising injury "caused by or at the direction of the insured with the knowledge that the act 
would violate the rights of another and would inflict 'personal and advertising injury"' or 
"arising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured 
with knowledge of its falsity " (Policy at p 5 ) Ohio Casualty contends that these 
intentional act exclusions apply because Edizone alleges, or at least its allegations suggest, that 
the Cloud Nine Defendants knew of their violation of Edizone's rights and knew the illegality of 
their conduct 
But the causes of action asserted against the Cloud Nine Defendants do not necessarily 
require that, in order to find liability, the defendant have knowledge of falsity or knowledge that 
its conduct would cause advertising injury See 15 U S C § 1114(1) (setting forth elements of 
trademark infringement), 15 U S C § 1125(a) (setting forth elements of false designation of 
origin), Utah Code Ann § 13-1 la-3 (defining deceptive trade practices), George v H S 
Peterson, 671 P 2d 208 (Utah 1983) (discussing the elements of common law trade name 
infringement) 
Courts have found that intentional act exclusions do not negate the duty to defend unless 
there is no potential for liability under the allegations See, e g , Central Mut Ins Co v 
StunFence, Inc , 292 F Supp 2d 1072, 1081-82 (ND 111 2003) (m trademark action, "insurer 
may refuse to defend only if it is clear from the face of the pleading that all of the allegations in 
the Underlying Action fall outside of the policy's actual or potential coverage') (emphasis in 
original), Elcom Tech , Inc v Hartford [ns Co of the Midwest, 991 F Supp 1294, 1298 (D 
Utah 1997) (holding that "knowledge of falsity" exclusion did not negate duty to defend because 
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false advertising claim could be proved by establishing reckless indifference); Union Ins. Co. v. 
Knife Co., Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1213, 1217 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (holding that intentional act 
exclusion did not negate duty to defend: "Since intent is not a required element of trademark 
infringement, there could be a finding of liability . . . even if the infringement were innocent"); 
Citizens Ins. Co, v. Pro-Seal Serv. Group, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 547, 555 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding that intentional act exclusion did not negate duty to defend trademark suit because there 
was potential for liability even if infringement were negligent, reckless, or innocent). 
Given the potential for liability in Edizone's allegations, the exclusions in the Policy do 
not free Ohio Casualty from its duty to defend. This conclusion is consistent with the Utah 
Supreme Court's declaration in Benjamin regarding the duty to defend alternative theories of 
intentional and unintentional liability. 
Where an insurance policy obligates an insurer to defend claims of unintentional 
injury, the insurer is obligated to do so until those claims are either dismissed or 
otherwise resolved in a manner inconsistent with coverage. Even where the 
complaint details egregious, intentional conduct, an expected injury exclusion like 
the one found in the Homeowners Policy does not relieve an insurer of its duty to 
defend claims of unintentional injury. Inferences and assumptions about an 
insured's intent to injure are improper and inconsistent both with the well-
accepted practice of alternative pleading and with our oft-repeated instruction that 
"insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their 
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of the insurance." 
Benjamin, 140 P.3d at 1215-16 (quoting United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 
521 (Utah 1993)). 
For all the foregoing reasons, the court holds that both Unigard and Ohio Casualty have a 
duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants in the underlying action of Edizone LC v. Cloud Nine 
LLC, Case No. 1:04-CV-117-TS (D. Utah). 
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IIL ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE COSTS 
Now that the court has determined that both Unigard and Ohio Casualty have a duty to 
defend against all of Edizone's claims, the next question concerns how they should share the 
defense costs. According to the Utah Supreme Court, "when apportioning defense costs among 
insurers, courts 'apply equitable principles . . . unless express policy language decrees the method 
of apportionment.7" Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997) 
(emphasis added). 
In this case, the Unigard and Ohio Casualty policies have identical provisions for Other 
Insurance and Method of Sharing, which provide, in relevant part: 
Other Insurance 
If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we 
cover under Coverages A or B of this Coverage Part, our obligations are limited as 
follows: 
a. Primary Insurance 
This insurance is primary except when b. below applies. If this 
insurance is primary, our obligations are not affected unless any of 
the other insurance is also primary. Then, we will share with all 
that other insurance by the method described in c. below. 
Method of Sharing 
If all of the other insurance permits contribution by equal shares, 
we will follow this method also. Under this approach each insurer 
contributes equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limit of 
insurance or none of the loss remains, whichever comes first. 
If any other insurance does not permit contribution by equal shares, 
we will contribute by limits. Under this method, each insurer's 
share is based on the ratio of its applicable limit of insurance to the 
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total applicable limits of insurance of all insurers. 
(Ohio Casualty Policy CGL Form at p. 10 (emphasis added); Unigard Policies CGL Form at 
p. 13, attached as Ex. B to Hill Decl.) Unigard contends that the "Method of Sharing" provision 
contained in both policies plainly provides for allocation of equal shares, and because there are 
two insurers, the court should find as a matter of law that an equal split of defense costs is the 
appropriate allocation. 
Ohio Casualty contends that the Other Insurance provisions quoted above do not apply 
because the policies are successive, not concurrent. Further, Ohio Casualty advocates the Sharon 
Steel equitable apportionment of costs based on "time on the risk" rather than an equal share 
approach between the insurers. According to Ohio Casualty, it owes 3/45ths in defense costs 
based on a ratio of months on the risk. The court disagrees. 
Ohio Casualty argues that the method of sharing set forth in the insurance policies' Other 
Insurance provisions only applies to the circumstance in which there are two concurrent primary 
policies, which have overlapping insurance policy periods. Such a limited application is not 
supported by the specific language of the provisions. Nothing in the provisions' language 
restricts their application to the circumstance of overlapping and/or concurrent insurance. The 
introductory paragraph describes the other insurance simply as insurance which is available to the 
insured for "a loss we cover." The term "loss" is a very broad term, and such "loss" can be 
caused by multiple "offenses" under Coverage B which can span successive policy periods. Had 
the insurers meant to limit the application of the Other Insurance provision to concurrent 
instances only, they could have drafted the language differently. As the policies stand now, there 
is no limiting language. 
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Also, Ohio Casualty's suggested allocation method—which includes allocating a six-
month period of time to the Cloud Nine Defendants (for a period of time during which they were 
unable to find and obtain insurance)—essentially advocates the position that an insurer has a duty 
to defend only those claims covered by its insurance policy. That proposition is directly contrary 
to Utah case law, which requires an insurer to defend covered and non-covered claims in the 
same lawsuit until the insurer can limit the suit to claims outside the policy. See, e.g., Benjamin 
v. Arnica Mut Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210, 1216 (Utah 2006) (c"[I]f an insurer has a duty to defend 
one count of a complaint, it must defend them all.'") (quoting Mt. Airy Ins. Co. v. Greenbaum, 
127R3dl5, 19(lstCir. 1997)). 
Based on the plain language of the insurance policies and Utah law regarding the scope of 
an insurer's duty to defend, the court holds that the defense costs in the Edizone case (incurred 
and to be incurred) are to be shared by Ohio Casualty and Unigard on an equal basis. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, Unigard Insurance Company's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Regarding Insurers' Defense Obligations is GRANTED. 
DATED this 14th day of November, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
TENA CAMPBELL 
United States District Judge 
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I. BACKGROUND 
EdiZone is a product and technology developer that licensed patents and 
other intellectual property to Cloud Nine for the manufacture and sale of an 
elastometer gel technology and a product known as "Celastic" and "GellyComb."1 
In the federal case against the Cloud Nine defendants, EdiZone alleged that those 
defendants had breached a licensing agreement allowing the manufacture, use, 
and sale of its products. In its initial complaint, EdiZone asserted claims for (1) 
patent infringement; (2) breach of contract; (3) constructive fraud; (4) fraudulent 
non-disclosure; (5) trademark infringement in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (6) 
common law trade name infringement and unfair competition; (7) deceptive trade 
practices in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 13~lla-3, part of the Utah Truth in 
Advertising Act; (8) misrepresentation and false designation of origin, in 
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); and (9) conspiracy. 
1
 EdiZone's website reports that "[a] unique product evolved out of EdiZONE's 
work with elastomers and gels. Called Intelli-Gel™ or Gellycomb™, this soft 
elastomer waffle structure conforms gently to broad surfaces and easy 
penetration of sharp surfaces. This unique combination of characteristics has 
changed the world of cushioning and toys." EdiZone reports that the Gellycomb 
products have been used by a foot products company and by a company that 
produces a pressure relief mattress overlay for critical care patients and a device 
to protect the heels of immobile patients against ulceration. See 
http://www.edizone.com. 
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Ohio Casualty issued a commercial general liability insurance policy to the 
Cloud Nine defendants that provided coverage for "Personal and Advertising 
Injury Liability" in the following terms: 
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of "personal and advertising injury" to which 
this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the 
insured against any "suit" seeking those damages. However, we will 
have no duty to defend the insured against any "suit"' seeking damages 
for "personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance does not 
apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any offense and settle any 
claim or "suit" that may result. 
Aplt's App. vol. II, at 337. 
The policy also stated that: 
This insurance applies to: 
"personal and advertising injury" caused by an offense arising out of 
your business but only if the offense was committed in the "coverage 
territory" during the policy period. 
id, 
Ohio Casualty's policy covered the period from June 10, 2001 to June 10, 
2002, while Unigard insured Cloud Nine for the three-year period from December 
12, 2002 to December 12. 2005. From June 10, 2002 to December 12, 2002, 
Cloud Nine did not have commercial liability insurance. 
After EdiZone filed its lawsuit in the federal district court in Utah, the 
Cloud Nine defendants requested both Ohio Casualty and Unigard to provide a 
defense. Unigard agreed to defend, but Ohio Casualty refused. Ohio Casualty 
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then filed this declaratory judgment action alleging that it had neither a duty to 
defend nor indemnify the Cloud Nine defendants. 
Unigard intervened as a plaintiff- It first asserted that, like Ohio Casualty, 
it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the Cloud Nine defendants. In the 
alternative, Unigard asserted that, if it did have a duty to defend or indemnify, 
then Ohio Casualty had the same duty-because the policies are essentially 
identical. 
The district court ruling at issue in this case concerns Unigard's motion for 
partial summary judgment. In that motion, Unigard argued that (a) Ohio Casualty 
had a duty to defend the EdiZone case; and (b) Ohio Casualty should share 
equally in paying defense costs. 
The district court ruled in favor oi Unigard on both issues. First, the court 
said, the EdiZone action alleged "an advertising injury" and, as a result, both 
Ohio Casualty and Unigard had a duty to defend the action. Second, the district 
court concluded, the two insurance companies should share equally in paying 
defense costs. Aplt's App. vol. XIII, at 2095.2 
2
 In the course of this declaratory judgment action, Ohio Casualty changed its 
position to some extent: it agreed to defend the Cloud Nine defendants under a 
reservation of rights, based on what it believed were materially new allegations in 
the Second Amended Complaint filed in the EdiZone action. Ohio Casualty 
subsequently acknowledged that it had a duty to defend the EdiZone case from the 
filing of the Second Amended Complaint. Thus, with regard to Ohio Casualty, 
the district court was required to decide only whether that insurer had a duty to 
defend before the filing of that complaint. Rec. vol. XIII, at 2096. 
(continued...) 
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In support of the latter ruling, the district court relied on the "Other 
Insurance" provision of the Ohio Casualty policy, which stated: 
4. Other Insurance 
If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a 
loss we cover under Coverages A or B of this Coverage Part, our 
obligations are limited as follows: 
a. Primary Insurance 
This insurance is primary except when b. below applies. If this 
insurance is primary, our obligations are not affected unless any of the 
other insurance is also primary. Then, we will share with all that other 
insurance by the method described in c. below. 
c. Method of Sharing 
If all of the other insurance permits contribution by equal shares, we 
will follow this method also. Under this approach each insurer 
contributes equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limit of 
insurance or none of the loss remains, whichever comes first. 
If any of the other insurance does not permit contribution by equal 
shares, we will contribute by limits. Under this method, each insurer's 
share is based on the ratio of its applicable limit of insurance to the 
total applicable limits of insurance of all insurers. 
Id. vol. II, at 342-43 (emphasis supplied); see also Rec. vol. III. at 604-05 (identical 
provision of Unigard's policies). 
The district court also invoked the broad scope of an insurer's duty to 
defend under Utah law. In its view, "Ohio Casualty's suggested allocation 
method . . . essentially advocates the position that an insurer has a duty to defend 
2(...continued) 
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only those claims covered by its insurance policy." i i vol. XIII, at 2110 
However, the court explained, "that proposition is directly contrary to Utah case 
law, which requires an insurer to defend covered and non-covered claims in the 
same lawsuit until the insurer can limit the suit to claims outside the policy." Id. 
Following the district court's decision, Ohio Casualty and Unigard paid 
fifty percent of the defense costs of the EdiZone case, as directed by the district 
court. In July 2007, the two insurers reached a settlement in the underlying case 
with EdiZone. As a result of the settlement, EdiZone dismissed its claims against 
the Cloud Nine defendants, and the remaining issues in this declaratory judgment 
action became moot. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Ohio Casualty now argues that the district court erred in relying upon the 
"other insurance" provision of the policies to conclude that the defense costs 
should be allocated equally between Ohio Casualty and Unigard. In its view, the 
"other insurance" provision only applies if there is other insurance "for a loss we 
cover." Here, during the period that Ohio Casualty provided insurance to Cloud 
Nine (June 10, 2001 to June 10, 2002), Unigard did not provide insurance to the 
Cloud Nine defendants. Because the "other insurance*' provision does not apply, 
Ohio Casualty continues, defense costs should be allocated by use of the time-on-
the-risk method adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Sharon Steel Corp, 931 
P.2dat 140. 
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In response, Unigard defends the district court decision Its argument turns 
on the policy's use of the phrase "[i]f other valid and collectible insurance is 
available to the insured for a loss we cover." Aplt's App. vol. II, at 342, It 
maintains that "[a] 'loss we cover' encompasses an isolated incident of 
injury /damage claim, triggering the circumstance of concurrent/overlapping 
coverage, and encompasses a continuing injury/damage claim caused by a tortious 
act continuing over a period of time, which spans and triggers successive policy 
periods Therefore, the Other Insurance provision applies to both concurrent and 
successive policies." Aple's Br. at 13 
Ohio Casualty's argument is supported by courts and scholars who have 
concluded that other insurance clauses do not generally apply to successive 
polices See Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co , 388 F.3d 1069, 1078-79 
(7th Cir 2004) (criticizing a district court's "highly questionable" application of 
an other insurance clause to successive policies) (Illinois law), St Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins Co v Vigilant Ins C o , 919 F 2d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating 
that "[it] appears that the district court may have been incorrect in relying on the 
policies' ^ other insurance' clauses to resolve [the proper allocation of insurers' 
responsibilities] . .[,] such clauses apply only when the coverage is concurrent 
Where, as here, the policies['] periods did not overlap at all, such clauses are not 
applicable ") (North Carolina law), Douglas R Richmond, Issues and Problems in 
"Other Insurance," Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insurance," 22 Pepp L Rev 
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1373, 1376-77 (1995) (stating that the characterization of successive policies as 
"other insurance" is "seriously flawed" because "while successive policies might 
insure the same type of risk, they do not insure the same risk" and because "so 
generous a definition wrongly suggests that insurers might be liable for damages 
occurring outside their policy periods"); Michael G. Doherty, Comment, 
Allocating Progressive Injury Liability Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64 
U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 278 (1997) (stating that "'[ojther insurance' clauses do not 
provide a solution to the allocation problem because they were not meant to 
allocate liability among successive insurers"); 23 Erik Mills Holmes et al., 
Holmes's Appleman on Insurance 2nd § 145.4[C] (1996) ('"Other insurance" 
refers only to two or more concurrent policies, which insure the same risk and the 
same interest, for the benefit of the same person, during the same period. 
However, wother insurance' clauses are not intended to allocate liability among 
successive insurers because they do not insure the same risk and would unjustly 
make consecutive insurers liable for damages occurring outside their policy 
periods."). 
However, other courts have disagreed, applying other insurance clauses to 
successive policies, as Unigard urges us to do here. For example, in Federal 
Insurance Co. v. Cablevision Systems Development Co , 836 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 
1987), the Second Circuit held that, under New York law, "other insurance" 
clauses in successive policies "indicatefd] an intent that the contributions by the 
-10-
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coinsurers to defense costs should be in equal amounts " Like the district court, 
the Second Circuit invoked the broad scope of an insurer's duty to defend, 
"[sjince the insurers cannot defend 'part' of the antitrust claims against [the 
insured] in the underlying . . . action, it is logical that insurers bear the costs of 
defense equally " Id_ The Supreme Court of Minnesota has reached the same 
conclusion. See Wooddale Builders, Inc , v Maryland Cas C o , 722 N W 2d 283, 
304 (Minn. 2006) ("[WJhen the pro-rata-by-time-on-the-nsk method applies to 
allocation of liability, and insurers participate in providing a defense to a common 
insured . defense costs are apportioned equally among insurers whose policies 
are triggered ") (Minnesota law) 
The Utah courts do not appear to have resolved the issue of whether other 
insurance provisions may be applied to successive policies Although both Ohio 
Casualty and Unigard contend that Sharon Steel supports their position, that 
decision instructs courts apportioning defense costs among insurers "to apply 
equitable principles unless express policy language decrees the method of 
apportionment " 93 I P 2d at ^140 Sharon Steel does not offer guidance on how 
to interpret other insurance clauses in successive policies that provide for 
"contribution by equal shares" "[i]f other valid and collectible insurance is 
available to the insured for a loss we cover " Aplt's App vol II, at 15 
Accordingly, we conclude that the question posed is controlling in this 
proceeding Certification of that question would further the interests of comity 
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and federalism by giving the Utah Supreme Court an opportunity to answer it in 
the first instance should it elect to do so under Utah R. App. P. 41 . 
The Clerk of this court shall transmit a copy of this certification order to 
counsel for all parties. The Clerk shall also forward, under the Tenth Circuit's 
official seal, a copy of this certification order and the briefs filed in this court to 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
We greatly appreciate the consideration of this request. This appeal is 
ordered STAYEiD pending resolution of the certified question.3 
Entered for the Court 
3
 We note that this appeal does not involve the question of how to apportion the 
ultimate costs of settlement in the Edizone case. Instead, it concerns only the 
method of apportioning the costs of defense. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
The Ohio Casualty 
Insurance Company, 
Appellant, 
v, 
Unigard Insurance Company, 
Appellee. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on certification of a 
question of state law by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Utah Supreme Court accepts the 
following question certified to it: 
As to the EdiZone case described by the certification order, 
whether the defense costs should be allocated between Appellant 
and Appellee under the "equal shares" method set forth in the 
"other insurance clause" of Appellant's policy or according to 
the "time on the risk" method described in Sharon Steel Corp. v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997). 
The certifying court has not filed any portion of the record 
in this matter with this Court. Within fourteen days of the date 
of this order, counsel for the parties shall advise this Court as 
to what portions of the record they believe necessary for 
consideration of the certified questions. 
Case No. 20090340-SC 
No. 08-4003 
Following the expiration of the fourteen days, this Court 
will request those portions of the record from the certifying 
court and provide notice to the parties as to a briefing 
schedule. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Date "flafthew B. Durrant 
Associate Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 18, 2009, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or 
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REBECCA L HILL 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN PC 
15 W S TEMPLE STE 800 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
MICHAEL L FORD 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 TRIAD CENTER STE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84180 
BARBARA K. BERRETT 
MARK D TAYLOR 
BERRETT & ASSOCIATES LC 
405 S MAIN ST STE 1050 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-0415 
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